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Preface
In preparing the present report, your Rapporteur was exfemely fortunate to receive much kind help
and assistance from all the authorities consulted and would like to take this opportunity publicly to thank
all concerned for their co-operation.
The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following:
lst-2nd March 1995 
- 
Anl<ara
Mr. Baki Tuc, Chairman of the National Defence Committee of the Ttukish Grand National Assembly,
and members of the committee
Major General Oktar ArervraN, Head of Srategy and Force Planning Department, Minisury of Defence
H.E. Mr. Yalim ERALp, Ambassador, Director-General Defence and Security, Ministry forForeign Affairs,
and members of his staff
Professor Siikrii GUREL, Professor of International Relations, University of Ankara
28th March 1995 
- 
Athens
Mr. Karolos Pepout-tas, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Gerasimos ARsEMs, Minister of Defence
Mr. Nikolaos KouRrs, Deputy Minister of Defence
Lieutenant-General Nikolaos Srarvmou-$, Deputy Chief HNDGS
Mr. TmoooRAKrso Secretary-General, Community Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Vasso Papauonrou, Chairman of the Greek Parliamentary Delegation to the WEU Assembly, and
members of the delegation
Mr. P. KRmros, Depury Speaker of the Hellenic Chamber of Deputies
Mr. E. Vr,nweKrs, Chairman of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hellenic Chamber of
Deputies, and members of the committee
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Draft Recommendatinn
on the Ea$tern Medilerranean
The Assembly,
(i) 
_ 
Welcoming the accession of Greece to WEU as a full member and the concomitant entry into force
of Turkey's associate membership of WEU on 6th March 1995;(ii) Concerned, however, that the many unsolved disputes between Greece and Turkey constitute a per-
manent threat to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and stand in the way of an effective
European security and defence policy in the region;(iii) Sressing that the only realistic means of achieving a global settlement of all disputes between Greece
and Turkey would be to stop revanchist ideas once and for all in respect of past hisiory and to follow the
example of Franc-e and Germany in acknowledging that there is no longer any question of looking back,
but of preparing for the future;
(lv,)_ 
_ 
Noting that a breakthrough in negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus
could be the key to a much-needed improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey;
(u.) 
-Approving the course set by the United Nations, whose initiatives to solve the Cyprus question pro-vide first for the introduction of confidence-building measures and subsequently for a gtoUa agreement on
the basis of ideas leading to the creation of a two-zone federal state, founded on e(uality betrveen the
Greek and Turkish communities;
(ui)_ 
_ 
Stressryg thg! confidence-building measures can only be implemented in parallet with a progressive
withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from northern Cyprus and their replacemenf by United Nations peace-
keeping forces with a view to a future demilitarisation of the whole island;
(yii1 Noting that negotiations should be accompanied by a full census of the population of the island of
9yp*, by.the_European Population Committee (CDPO), as proposed by the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, in order to solve the problem of settleis;
(viii) Welcomi-ngthe decision of the Permanent Council of WEU to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus that
will evolve with the development of links between Cyprus and the European Union, but regr6tting that
Turkey has dissociated itself from that decision;
(i.r) Stressing that a-continued massive presence of Turkish armed forces is one of the important issues
standing in the way of a solution of the Cyprus question;
@) f{gting with concern that the FYROM is still not a member of the OSCE, an organisation to which
the WEU Council attaches $eat importance in its Lisbon declaration, particularly on account of its poten-
tial as q primary instrument for early warning, conflict-prevention and crisis-management, as weli as in
promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights;
(.ri) 
-. 
Noting that the FYROM has already amended its constitution in order to satisfy European Union
conditions for its recognition as a state and that Greece acknowledges that the FYROIvI does nbt constitu-
te a military threat;
(xii) Concerned that the continuation of Greece's frade embargo against the FYROM is jeopardising the
much-needed development of the FYROM's economy which could easily result in furthei destabilisation
of the situation in that country and, subsequently, in the region;
(xiii). Welcoming existing good relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the recent improvement in
relations between Greece and Albania;
(xiv) Convinced that'Turkey has long ago made the basic choice to be a secular state respecting human
rights and.the ru-l-es of democracy, but, at the same time, noting that it still has problems carrying these
principles into effect;
(m) Condemning all forms of terrorism, even if used as a means of attaining political objectives;
(ruz)_ Stressing that _a clear distinction should be drawn between the intolerable terrorism practised by thePKK on the one hand and the legitimate aspiration of the Kurdish people freely to express its cuttural iden-
tity within the Turkish state on the other;
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(ruii) Welcoming the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from haqi territory in accordance with Turkey's
engagements towards the European Union's troika on23rd March 1995, but concerned by statements by
the Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel, who, if need be, does not rule out the possibility of further mili-
tary operations on Iraqi territory;
(xviii) Stressing the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of all states in the region;
(xk) Noting that a satisfactory global solution can be found to the claims of Kurdish nationalists in the
region only if all the states concerned accept a more pluralist and more decenralised system of govern-
ment allowing their citizens free enjoyment of a cultural identity that is rightfully theirs;
(xx) Noting that the continued existence of a so-called " security zone" in northern Iraq has resulted in
legal uncertainty and political chaos which is seriously threatening stability and security in the region;
(xxi) Aware that an early reintegration of Iraq as a normally functioning state in the region, providing fulI
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, together with an evolution of state
inslitrations towards a more democratic system, would greatly contribute to stability in the border area
between Turkey and Iraq;
(xrli) Stressing that the Kurdish question, if not solved properly by granting the Kurds some rights of
cultural self-efpression and a form of political and administrative autonomy that does not impinge upon
the territorial integriry of the Tirkish state, will continue to threaten security and stability in Tirrkey, limit-
ing the government's possibilities of conducting a balanced security and defence policy and being inte-
grated into Europe's intergovernmental and supranational structures;
(xxiii) Noting the importance of all European allies having a co-ordinated policy in the present conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(xxiv) Concerned by the violation of the CFE Treaty represented by Russia's announcement of the crea-
tion and build-up of the 58th Russian Army in the northern Caucasus and the threat it thus brings to bear
on stability in the region,
RBcorvrpmNos rHAr rrm Corxcu.
l. Place the promotion of a settlement of existing disputes between Greece and Ttrrkey high on its
agenda, knowing that the continuation of these disputes will prevent the establishment of an effective
European security and defence policy in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean;
2. Remind both Greece and Turkey that, according to the Petersberg declaration, their mutual relations
should be based on the fundamental principles of settlement of their differences by peaceful means and
refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force;
3. Remind Greece of the importance the WEU Council attaches to the place of the OSCE in the Euro-
pean security architecture and urge this WEU member state to stop vetoing the FYROM's accession to the
OSCE;
4. Use the dialogue now started with Cyprus to promote, as a matter of urgency, a solution of the
Cyprus question following the course set by the United Nations;
5. In the dialogue with Russia, state clearly that no decision which might lead to a violation of the CFE
Treaty can be tolerated and that possible modifications to this treaty can be discussed only at the 1996 CFE
Treaty review conference;
6. Remind Turkey that a progressive withdrawal of the Tlrkish military occupation forces from the
northern part of Cyprus 
- 
which is to start negotiations on accession to the European Union six months
after the 1996 ntergovernmental conference, logically to be followed by accession to WEU 
- 
will be
inevitable in view of the obligations under Part Itr of the Petersberg declaration to refrain from resorting
to the threat or use of force in relations between member states and associate member states; the above
withdrawal being followed by a reduction in forces and equipment throughout Cyprus leading to a demili-
tarised island.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mn Cuc6, Rapporteur)
Introduction
1. With Greece having acceded to full mem-
bership of WEU on 6th March 1995, and Tlrkey
having become an associate member on the same
date, WEU has taken on a new dimension which
will force it to pay increasing attention to problems
in the Eastern Mediterranean. First and foremost,
it will be faced with differences between Greece
and Turkey on a wide range of subjects. But it will
also have to deal with many other issues.
2. One of these is Greece's foreign and securi-
ty policy which has not always obtained the full
understanding of its European partners.
3. The case of Turkey may be even more com-
plicated. Turkey is a member of NAIO and has
concluded an agreement with the European Union
on the establishment of a customs union, but full
membership does not seem to be imminent.In the
Council of Europe, in particular, Turkey is stron-
gly criticised for its human rights record and
shortcomings in its constitution regarding demo-
cratic rights. The European Union has also asked
Turkey to make progress in this field.
4. Being a security and defence organisation,
WEU, while sharing the views of the Council of
Europe and the European Union as regards human
rights and democracy in Turkey, has the obliga-
tion to consider Turkey's r6le in the region from a
slightly different angle. In this report, the chapters
on Ttukey will therefore focus on the security and
defence aspects of Turkey's policy in a wider
sense. The present report also again stresses that
Turkey occupies a strategic geographical position
which makes it a vital ally for Europe in its secu-
rity and defence policy.
5. Cyprus, finally, is still a divided island
which has been a subject of discord between Tur-
key and Greece throughout the more than thirty
years of its existence as an independent state.
Obviously, the status of this island is still a key
issue in relations between both states. If Cyprus
becomes a full member of the European Union, it
will have to choose between becoming an
observer or a full member of WEU.
6. The objective of the present report is to pro-
vide an account of the position of Cyprus, Greece
and Turkey in the region and their possible r6le in
Europe's defence and security policy, leaving
other issues to be discussed by the various bodies
concerned.
Panr OuB: TUnxBv
I. Political parties and the rise
of I s lamic fa n dame ntalis m
7. At the moment, Turkey's political life is
passing through a period of turbulence in which
the relative sfrength of the main political parties is
undergoing important changes.
8. The True Path Party, which won 27Vo of
votes in the 1991 general elections, further dimi-
nished to 22.5Vo in the 1994 municipal elections.
The Social Democratic Populist Parry, hit by cor-
ruption scandals and by its failure to have its eco-
nomic and human rights policy adopted by the
government, has been losing supporters. It had
already decreased fromAovo of the votes in 1991
to l3.2Vo in 1994. In January 1995, an effort to
merge with the Republican People's Party failed,
but a new effort succeeded. In March of this year,
the two merged parties agreed on a renewed coa-
lition with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True
Path Party, with Mr. Hikmet Cetin having become
Deputy Prime Minister and for the time being, it
seems that the existing coalition government has a
good chance to complete its full term in autumn
1996.
9. Support is growing for the extreme right
National Action Party under the leadership of
Alparslan Turkes, with an ultra-nationalist pro-
gramme including an outspoken policy against
Kurdish nationalists. It is also respectful of the
values of Islam and appeals to many non-funda-
mentalist Muslims. It has only 16 seats in parlia-
ment, but obtained 8.4Vo of votes in the municipal
elections of 1994 and might become the major
right-of-cenfre party in the next general elections.
Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party is another
party with growing support.
10. The Motherland Party, now under the lea-
dership of Mesut Ylmaz, which obtained almost
4OVo of the votes in the general elections of 1987,
fell to 24Vo in the general elections of 1991 and
2l.2%o in the municipal elections of 1994.
ll. In fact, the Islamic Refah Party, headed by
Necmeddin Erbakan, is the only big parry whose
support has been steadily growing in recent years,
upfrom lTVoin 1991 to l9%oin1994.
12. In an opinion poll taken at the beginning of
1995 published by the newspaper Milliyet, the
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Islamic Refah Party obtained22.4%o, followed by
the Democratic Left Party.
13. Voter support for the Islamic Refah Parry
has been steadily growing since the 1987 general
elections and, in fact, it is the fastest growing poli-
tical party in Thrkey. After municipal elections in
1994, it has taken confrol of many local govern-
ments, including those of Istanbul and Ankara. As
is the case in other Islamic countries around the
Mediterranean, the Islamic fundamentalist party
in Turkey offers subsidised bread, health clinics,
hostels for students and other services where
government institutions are deficient. One of its
main attractions has also been its anti-comtption
platform. The Refah Party has the objective of
establishing an Islamic republic, which will resist
closer links between Turkey and the European
Union, wants to pull Turkey out of NATO and
forge closer ties with other Muslim states.
14. The growing importance of the Islamic
Refah Parry as a political factor is partly caused
by the country's economic situation and the inabi-
lity of both national and local government to cope
with the problems of a rapidly-growing urban pro-
letariat with little prospect of employment and
often appalling living conditions. The Refah Party
is also trying to win Kurdish votes, distancing
itself from Turkish nationalism by implying that
an Islamic republic would satisfy the demands for
Kurdish identity through " Islamic brotherhood ".
15. One should guard against the simplification
frequently suggested in the mass media which
presents Islamic fundamentalism as a well-lubri-
cated, violent and merciless organisation orches-
trated by Iran with the help of other radical
r6gimes. Most, if not all experts, agtee that there
is no pan-Islamic fundamentalism and there is litt-
le evidence of sftategic co-ordination. Through-
out history and still today, the Islamic world has
distinguished itself through internal strife and
lack of unity.
16. Certainly, as any political party, the Refah
Party's objective is control of power, but it has
chosen to participate in the democratic process.
Turkey's greatest assets in building a modern and
prosperous nation have always been its secular
society and democratic institutions, started under
Kemal Atatiirk's leadership. Through their parti-
cipation in the democratic process, Turkish Isla-
mic fu ndamentalists are obtaining responsibilities
and opportunities to show whether their ideology
has practical value. They will be held accountable
by voters and, at the same time, they are beco-
ming used to pluralistic politics.
17. On the other hand, any Turkish Govern-
ment has an urgent duty to fight against colrup-
tion, dislocation, unemployment and inequity,
factors creating an ideological vacuum which is a
fertile breeding ground for Islamic fundamenta-
lism. It will have to fight against uncontrolled
migration from rural areas to urban centres and
against a population growth which cannot be
absorbed by the economy'.
18. Recently, there have been serious clashes
involving the Alawites, who account for 10 to 15
million of Turkey's population of over 60 million,
a Shiite community practising a less strict form of
Islam and in favour of the secular state. They are
disliked by the fundamentalist minority among
the mainly Sunni population. Sunni Muslims
killed 37 Alawites during a riot in the city of Sivas
in 1993, and between 20 and 30 were killed in
incidents in lstanbul on 13th March 1995 and the
following days which are believed to have started
with attacks by a fundamentalist Sunni group.
Such clashes are certainly connected with reli-
gious fanaticism but they cannot reasonably be
seen as part of a political scheme to destabilise the
Turkish state, as some obseryers have tried to
make believe.
(a) Human rights
19. Although far from being the main subject of
this report, it has to be mentioned that the human
rights situation in Turkey remains an issue of
concern to its closest western allies. Reference is
made in particular to recent reports of the Parta-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, such
as those of the Legal Affairs and Human Rights
Committee on the consequences of the dissolution
of the Parry for Democracy (DEP) in T\rrkey, by
Mr. Jurgens (Document 7ll2) and the report on
the visit to Ankara of the ad hoc committee on
Resolution 1041 submitted by Mr. Martinez, Pre-
sident of the Assembly (Document 7159, Adden-
duml).
20. Recently, three reports were published
confirming a situation which leaves room for
considerable improvement.
21. In March 1995, Turkey's independent
Human Rights Association published a report
which documented some 1 000 cases of torture
and nearly 300 summary executions committed
during 1994'.
22. In February 1995, the United Nations spe-
cial investigator into torture, Nigel Rodley, repor-
ted that torture appeared to be widespread in Tur-
key with electric shocks, sexual assault, food
deprivation and death threats among the most
common forms. Still, the Turkish Government
denies widespread torhre, stating that it pursues a
legitimate fi ght against terrorism.
1. According to the 1990 census, the urban population
increased by 43.lVo in the period 1985-90 and the annual
average population growth rate is2.27o
2. Turkey's Daily News,2nd March 1995.
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23. Amnesty International stated in a report
released on 8th February L995 that torture,
" disappearances " and extra-judicial killings in
Turkey are increasing sharply. It has blamed the
security forces for perpeffating such crimes 'o with
impunity throughout the country ". It also stated
that PKK guerrillas carry out summary executions
and kill civilians despite their promise in Decem-
ber 1994 to observe the Geneva Conventions3.
24. Other European institutions, in particular
the Council of Europe and the European Union,
have repeatedly insisted during recent months that
Tirkey should respect its commitments to make
significant progress in constitutional and legislat-
ive reforms.
25. There is little use in adding much more to
those earlier requests than to say that, according to
prevailing opinion and experience in Western
Europe, full respect of democratic and human
rights by the state and its institutions is one of the
best guarantees against internal destabilisation
and insecurity in a country.
26. On 2nd May last, Turkey's Minister for
Foreign Affairs stated in the Grand National
Assembly of Ttrkey:
" Turkey is resolved to move forward in
democracy and human rights in accordance
with the expectations of the Turkish people.
Indeed, the process of democratisation
started is being pursued irrevocably in the
Grand National Assembly of TUrkey. "
This is a very welcome declaration and it is only
to be hoped that the results of this process will
soon be apparent.
(b) The Kurdish problem
27. Since 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) has been fighting violent guerrilla warfare
combined with terrorist operations, concenfrated
mainly in the south-eastern part of Turkey. Its
objective is to establish a separate Kurdish state.
Over the years, Twkey's fight against the PKK has
developed into a massive operation in which an
estimated 315 000 soldiers, special forces and state
sponsored village guards are involved at ayearly
cost of $8.2 billion or one-fifttr of the Turkish state
budget. An estimated 15 000 people have been
killed in guerrilla operations and counter-offen-
sives. In the past three years, both sides in the
conflict have stepped up operations into all out war.
28. ln October 1992,the PKK for the first time
made an almost battalion-sized massive attack
against Turkish border posts which resulted in the
death of 257 PKK supporters and 60 security
force members.
29. Turkey's Government forces responded
with a large scale cross-border offensive against
PKK camps in Iraq, co-operating with Iraqi-based
Kurdish guerrillas of the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). Although these operations were not com-
pletely successful, on 20th March 1993, the PKK
leader, Abdullah Ocalan, called for a temporary
ceasefire and negotiations. Fighting activities
were reduced, but were resumed full scale after
thirty-eight soldiers were killed in a deadly ambush
staged by the PKK on 24thMay 1993. In its follo-
wing campaign, the PKK expanded its activities
to cover the whole eastern part of Turkey from the
north, near the Armenian border, to the south,
near the border with Iraq. In spring 1994, the Tur-
kish Government forces intensified their counter-
insurgency programme with new operations
employing a total of 240 000 roops from the 2nd
and 3rd armies and from western units. Opera-
tions included air raids and hot pursuit of terro-
rists across the border.
30. Another tactic still in use is to remove the
population from mountain villages and hamlets
and destroy their dwellings, which denies the
PKK information, food and shelter. The objective,
as announced by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, is
to move this mountain population to collective
villages for which the European Resettlement
Fund has offered Turkey $227 million.
31. On 20th March 1995, Turkey embarked
upon its largest military operation against the
PKK on Iraqi territory when 35 000 Turkish
troops, backed by heavy equipment and fighter-
bomber aircraft launched an attack across the nor-
thern Iraqi border against PKK baseso. According
to the Turkish Government, the objective was to
eliminate PKK terrorist bases across the Turkish
border. hime Minister, Tansu Ciller, said: " We
are determined that, in this final operation, the job
will definitely be done.'o It is said that, at the
same time, the Turkish Government wanted to
give a warning to the Kurdish factions in Northern
Iraq to do their job and control the PKK on their
territory in exchange for Turkish support. Turkey
also wishes the Iraqi Kurds to start negotiations
with the Iraqi Government.
32. The operation came under criticism from
Turkey's European allies and later also from the
United States. The French Foreign Minister, Alain
Jupp6, speaking on behalf of the European Union,
said that the European Union was " worried by the
massive character of the intervention " and
concerned about the " damage done to the civilian
population ". Germany, which since 1964 has pro-
vided Turkey, at no cost, with military equipment
4. A little later, an additional 25 000 troops were sent to the
Tunceli province in eastern Turkey in order to fight other
groups ofPKK rebels.
9
3. Financial Times, Sth February 1995.
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worth a total value of $4.2 million, has stopped
any further deliveries and suspended financial aid
for the construction of two MEKO frigates for
Turkey'.
33. On 6th April 1995, the European Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution with 411 votes in
favour, none against and six abstentions, which
said that it: " strongly condemns Turkey's milita-
ry intervention in northern kaq and the resulting
violations of international law and human rights. "
The resolution further stated: " The state of
human rights in Turkey is too grave to allow for
the formation of the proposed customs union at
present. "
34. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe on 26th April 1995, adopted a Recom-
mendation condemning Turkey's military inter-
vention which it regarded as " conftary to interna-
tional law " and expressed " its anxiety for the
safety of the civilian population'0. The Assembly
considered that Turkey o'should immediately
withdraw its forces and commit itself to seeking a
peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem ".
35. Without pushing too hard, the United States
Government made it understood that it wanted an
exit date. It left no doubt that it viewed the PKK
rebels as terrorists and understood why Turkey
would want to act against them, but it was " extre-
mely concerned " lest this operation would harm
Ankara's further integration with Europeu.
36. The United States Deputy Secretary of
State, Strobe Talbott, provided his view of the
situation when he addressed an audience in Ankara
on llth April 1995. According to Mr. Talbott, this
massive Turkish operation would not be the end
of PKK's separatist fight. A long-term solution to
the rebel threat along Ttrkey's south-east border
lay with a new order in Baghdad. In the meantime,
only haqi Kurds could confrol the border and pre-
vent the PKK from infilnating terrorists into Tur-
key. Kurdish factions in northern Iraq should stop
their internal violence.
37. The United States was opposed to the esta-
blishment of an independent state for ethnic
Kurds, but autonomy or another system of ser-
government might eventually be negotiated in
states where Kurdish communities live. He added:
" All citizens of a state, whatever their nationaliry
religion or language should feel themselves to be
full citizens. If a state can meet that standard, then
it is much less likely to have a problem with
secessionist terrorists 7. "
38. Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Hikmet
Cetin, set a completely different tone when he
Le Figaro, 30th March 1995.
lnternational Herald Tribune, llth April 1995.
Intemational Herald Tribune, l2th April 1995.
addressed a London audience on 8th April 1995.
Mr. Cetin rejected claims that the Turkish opera-
tion in northern Iraq violated international law,
saying that there was a legal vacuum in that part,
caused by the creation of a Kurdish o' safe haven "
north of the 36th parallel. The solution was for the
lraqi Government to comply with all United
Nations resolutions and so regain its legal authori-
ty over the whole of its territory. Mr. Cetin further
refused to accept that in Turkey there existed a
conflict between the government and the Turkish
minority in the south-east. He ruled out any chan-
ge in government policy, such as permitting edu-
cation in the Kurdish languages.
39. On 4th May 1995, Turkey's Defence
Minister, Mehmet Golan, announced that all Tur-
kish troops had withdrawn from Iraqi tenitory six
weeks after the beginning of the operation in
which the army claims to have killed at least
555 PKK fighters, desfioyed their bases and train-
ing camps in the area and seized sophisticated
weapons. It was reported that on 3rd and 4th May,
a high-ranking Iraqi-Kurdish delegation met
Turkish officials in Ankara to discuss confiol of
the Iraqi side of the border after a full Turkish
withdrawal.
40. Later, on 9th May 1995, the European
Union issued the following declaration:
" The European Union, which regards the
stability and territorial integrity of the states
of the region as a matter of importance, has
noted with satisfaction the announcement
of the total withdrawal of Turkish troops
from northern haq, in accordance with the
undertakings given by Turkey to the troika
on 23rd March. It hopes that Ankara will
deal similarly with the other concerns voi-
ced by the European Union in recent
months concerning democracy and human
rights, thus creating more favourable
conditions for the bringing about of the
desired rapprochement between the Euro-
pean Union and Turkey, with a view in par-
ticular to the implementation of the agree-
ment on Customs Union. "
41. The European Union's reference to the
territorial integrity of the states in the region may
have been meant to remind Turkey of the stand-
ing policy that borders in the region should not
be changed. On 2nd May last, President Suley-
man Demirel declared that Turkey would like to
correct its frontier with Iraq in order to ensure its
impermeability'. At the moment, it is not known
whether this was an indication of a change in
Turkey's foreign policy or a declaration made
8. The lndependent, Tth April 1995.
9. LeMonde, llthMay 1995.
5.
6.
7.
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with considerations of internal political strife in
mind.
42. Itis observedthatevenifTurkey succeeded
in eliminating the PKK in northern Iraq, its war on
Turkey's own territory will not end soon. The
campaign against the separatist Kurds in south-
eastern Turkey is often accompanied by discrimi-
nation and violence against the civilian popula-
tion. Complete villages are being destroyed and
their inhabitants resettled. Human rights organisa-
tions and also the Council of Europe have repor-
ted murder, torture and other human rights viola-
tions. Such behaviour is driving people into the
hands of separatist movements and even the PKK,
which has a steady supply of guerrilla recruits.
Nobody can deny that the PKK is responsible for
objectionable violent terrorist attacks, summary
executions, hostage-taking and destruction of
civilian property.
43. The Turkish Government has the right and
the obligation to protect its population against
terrorism, but it should also accept that the pro-
blem of Kurdish nationalism cannot be solved by
military operations. Turkey might have prevented
the Kurdish nationalist problem from growing
out ofproportion into a state security problem if
it had granted the Kurds greater rights of cultural
self-expression including the indiscriminate use
of the Kurdish language. Succeeding Turkish
govemments, however, have stressed the ethnic
Turkish character of the state, which left no room
for any institutional expression of other ethnic
identities.
4. It has been pointed out that in many wes-
tern European states ethnic minorities have obtai-
ned cultural rights of self-expression without this
resulting in the dissolution of the state. The Spa-
nish constitution granted nationalities and regions
of the state a wide measure of autonomy within
a decentralised Spain, but still solidly united as
a state, and as a consequence the popularity of
radical Basque nationalism resorting to violence
has diminished considerably.
45. The establishment of a separate Kurdish
state in south-eastern Turkey is very hard to ima-
gine, also because of strong resistance from Iran,
Iraq and Syria, each with important Kurdish
minorities on their territory. Moreover, it is
known that many of Turkey's 15 million Kurds
are living in parts of Turkey other than the south-
eastern region. It seems inevitable, however, for
some form of local and regional autonomy, inclu-
ding cultural rights, to be granted to Kurds living
in the south-east of the counffry in order to meet
the requirements of a democratic state in which
the rights of religious minorities, as stipulated in
the Treaty of Lausanne, and of ethnic minorities
are recognised.
II. Defence spending
and the Turkish armedforces
46. Turkey feels that, taking into consideration
the many changes which took place in the Black
Sea area and at its eastern and southern frontiers
after the end of the cold war, its naditional r6le of
flank country has been transformed into one of a
front nation.
47. In the early 1990s, Turkey decided to start a
major modernisation and restructuring of its
armed forces. Defence expenditures were increas-
ed and the national defence industrial base was
enlarged.
48. The Turkish army is now implementing a
reorganisation in which the division command
level is being replaced, with a few exceptions, by
more flexible brigades. Manpower has been redu-
ced to a peacetime strength of 500 000, but the
operations against the PKK have caused an increa-
se of the length of conscript service by five months.
Figures regarding defence spending in Turkey are
given in Appendix I of the present report.
49. Turkey is closely observing negotiations
between Russia and Ukraine on the division of the
Black Sea fleet and the use of bases and shipyards
in llkraine. A satisfactory solution for both parties
is considered to be an important factor for stabili-
sation in the region. Relations between the Tirkish
and Russian naval forces have improved and both
countries have signed an agreement on the preven-
tion of incidents on and over the high seas with
both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey has noted Rus-
sia's declaration that it considers the Black Sea and
the Caucasus as fust priority sffategic areas.
50. The cascading of CFE surplus equipment
from other NATO countries has considerably
increased the equipment numbers of the Turkish
armed forces. Turkey received M-60 tanks, Leo-
pard-I tanks, M-l10 203 mm self-propelled guns,
UR-416 armoured personnel carriers, AH-l
Cobra attack helicopters and UH-60 Black Hawk
utility helicopters. Orders were placed for Russian
Mi-17 and French 5A-365 Cougar helicopters.
The navy commissioned eight United States
Knox-class destroyers. In the airforce, all the
F-104 Starfighters have now been retired from
service. Deliveries of new F-16s continued and
more F-4s were received from Germany.
51. The restructuring and modernisation of
Turkey's armed forces is explained in more detail
in the following paragraphs.
(a) Anny
52. The army's objective is to create forces
with high mobility, fre power, shock reaction and
endurance. They should be capable of long-range
target detection, identification and recognition.
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The restructured forces should be flexible, easy to
control and multi-pu{pose, capable of effective
and rapid mobilisation. It is envisaged to employ
profes sional personnel for critical missions.
53. While no changes were made in the number
of armies and corps, the infanfiry-heavy organisa-
tion of regiments and divisions has been abando-
ned and new self-sufficient armoured and mecha-
nised battalions and brigades have been created.
54. The Turkish army is being re-equipped
with the help of funds from various national
sources, United States credits, United States sou-
thern region aid, German military assistance pro-
grarnmes and through CFE Treaty ffansfers from
other NAIO member states.
55. Important modernisation projects being
implemented are:
- 
the purchase and co-production of the
Sikorsky Black Hawk and the Eurocop-
ter Cougar, both utility helicopters, and
procurement of the Cobra and Super
Cobra for protection/escort missions and
anti-tank defence;
- 
updating of existing M-48 tanks and ove-
rhaul and delivery of 822 M-60 tanks
from the United States and Leopard
tanks provided by Germany;
- 
domestic manufacture of armoured com-
bat vehicles and improved armoured per-
sonnel carriers;
- 
procurement of tank trailers, needed for
inter-region flexibility of armoured and
mechanised units;
- 
modernisation of existing 155 mm self-
propelled howitzers and conversion of
105 mm howitzers to 155 mm self-pro-
pelled howitzers;
- 
procurement of multiple launch rocket
systems, capable of launching both roc-
kets and tactical missiles.
56. Other equipment programmes are being
planned or implemented in army aviation, target
acquisition, identification and recognition, C3I
and air defence.
(b) Ai.rforce
57. At present, the lst and 2nd Tactical Air
Force Command constitute the primary strike
power of the T[rkish air force. They comprise a
total of nineteen NATO-assigned combat squa-
drons, made up of six F-4, seven F-16, three
F-104 and three F-5 squadrons, armed with Side-
winder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles, and
Maverick, Rockeye, Durandal, CBU, LGB and
conventional bomb ammunition. Additionally,
two of the present F-16 squadrons have Lantirn
capability.
58. Moreover, there is a training command,
consisting of six squadrons with different types of
aircraft, an air logistics command and four air
transportation squadrons, equipped with C-130
and C-160 medium transport aircraft and CN-135
light ransport aircraft and UH-1H helicopters for
special tasks.
59. A modernisation programme envisages a
number of important update and procurement
activities. F-104 and F-5 aircraft which have com-
pleted their economic life will be phased out when
the number of F-16 aircraft 
- 
procurement of
which began in 1986 under joint Turkish-United
States production 
- 
reaches the desired level. Fur-
thermore, efforts to equip F-16 aircraft in service
with state-of-the-art elecffonic warfare equipment
have reached the final phase. A total of 240 F-16s
have now been ordered. Modernisation efforts to
upgrade F4 and F-5 aircraft still in use are under-
way.
60. The acquisition of A-10 aircraft scheduled
to enter into service for effective support for the
land forces has also reached its final phase. The
acquisition of CN-135 light transport aircraft has
begun under joint Turkish-Spanish production. In
addition, air force participation in the joint
European future large aircraft (FLA) project will
replace C-130/C-160 aircraft which will complete
their economic life in the year 2000.
(c) Navl
6I. Tirkey expects the future extended exploi-
tation of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region
and the development of the Black Sea economic
co-operation area which seeks to integrate the
economic and commercial interests of the Black
Sea region with those in the Mediterranean basin
to have far-reaching consequences.
62. The protection and security of the sea lanes
of communication in the Black Sea will continue
to be one of the Turkish navy's essential tasks.
The addition of new international oil terminals in
Turkish seaports located in the eastern Mediterra-
nean in the future will further increase the impor-
tance of protecting the sea lanes of communica-
tion in the region and widen the tasks carried out
by the Turkish navy in co-operation with other
allied naval forces.
63. With the preceding considerations in mind,
the Turkish navy is now undertaking an important
modernisation programme with the following
main procurement proj ects :
- 
construction of a fifth, sixth, seventh and
eighth Meko 200 class frigate, to enter
into service between 1995 and 1998;
T2
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- 
construction of four 1 400 ton subma-
rines, to be equipped with harpoon gui-
ded missiles and Tigerfish torpedoes,
bringing the total number of submarines
to ten. The 10th submarine is to be com-
missioned in 1998;
- 
construction of five more Dogan class
fast parol boats, equipped with guided
missiles, bringing the total number to
thirteen, of which the last is to be com-
missioned in 1999;
- 
construction of a second auxiliary oil
replenishment ship, to be commissioned
in 1995.
64. For the longer term, the procurement of
additional frigates, new anti-submarine warfare
helicopters, six mine-hunter ships and the replace-
ment of maritime patrol aircraft is being planned.
III. Relations wilh other countries in the regian
(a) The Tlanscaacasian regian
(i) Georgia
65. Turkey maintains relations of co-operation
and good neighbourliness with Georgia, respec-
ting the principles of territorial integrity, protec-
tion of human rights and the solution of conflicts
by peaceful means also in the recent inter-ethnic
conflicts which have plagued this newly-indepen-
dent state.
66. In the Abkhazian conflict, Turkey supports
the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-Gene-
ral's special representative to find a peaceful solu-
tion and to settle the political status of Abkhazia.
It also supports the efforts of the OSCE mission to
find a political solution for South Ossetia.
67. Since Georgia's independence, Turkey has
provided humanitarian aid totalling around $18
million. In February l993,the Tirkish Eximbank
opened a credit line of $50 million and it stands
ready to open a credit line for a similar amount. In
order to help Georgia overcome its shortage of
energy supply, Turkey has provided electric ener-
gy to a total value of $80 million.
68. Moreover, Turkey is setting up long-term
co-operation prograrnmes which should be the
basis of further economic links between the two
neighbours and other states in the region. Mention
should be made of co-operation in the fields of
energy, ffansport, telecommunications, trade and
the opening of new border crossings.
(ii) Azerbaijan
69. On 9th November 1991, Azerbaijan was
the first newly-independent republic on the
territory of the former Soviet Union to receive
Turkish recognition. With the signing of a proto-
col on 13th January 1992, Baku was the fust of
the new capitals to receive a Tirkish embassy. As
early as November 1991, a Turkish-Azeri busi-
ness council was established in order to develop
commercial relations between the two countries.
70. There can be no doubt that of all the coun-
tries in that region, Turkey has the closest rela-
tions with Azerbaijan. This is partly due to the
existence of an important Azeri community
within Tirkey which acts as an efficient lobby. At
the same time, however, the Turkish business
community has a strong preference for trading
with Azerbaijan which has a vigorous small busi-
ness culture, is geographically close'to Turkey
and speaks a Turkish language very similar to
Anatolian Tirrkish.
71. In Azerbaijan, digital telephone systems
and communications via the Tiirksat satellite were
established with Turkish assistance. The Turkish
Eximbank in 1992 granted an export credit of
$100 million and a project credit of $150 million,
while a $100 million credit was granted to the
autonomous republic of Nakhitchevan.
72. [t should be mentioned that Turkey is
concerned over the internal political situation in
Azerbaijan'0.
73. [n October 1994,there was a series of vio-
lent incidents which had atl the appearance of a
coup attempt in which the Interior Ministry's
OMON special purpose militia, led by Ravshan
Javadov, played an important r6le. hesident Gei-
dar Aliyev imposed a state of emergency and a
curfew in Baku and later dismissed Prime Minis-
ter Surat Guseinov because of his involvement in
the alleged coup attempt.
74. After these incidents in October l994,he-
sident Geidar Aliyev claimed, on 5th October,
that Russia was deliberately destabilising Azer-
baijan by covert means in order to force the coun-
try to permit the deployment of Russian troops on
the Iranian border and to gain a larger stake in the
Caspian oil deal.
75. In March 1995, there was a new outburst of
street fighting caused by the Interior Ministry's
militia under Ravshan Javadov because of a dis-
pute with the government over plans for the mili-
tia's disbandment. The militia called for President
Aliyev's government to be replaced by a coalition
government. Interior Minister Ramil Usubov
stated that the militia, which allegedly has been
smuggling strategic materials out of the counfiry,
had " joined up with criminal gangs ".Meanwhile,
the situation has calmed down again, but when
President Aliyev on the occasion of his visit to the
10. The conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is
dealt with in chapter Itr of this report.
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European Union on 18th April 1995 pressed for
closer political ties, the President of the European
Commission reiterated that the European Union
would not make agreements with any Transcauca-
sian state as long as the region remained unstable tr.
(iii) Armenia
76. The conflict between Azeris and Arme-
nians, and similarly between Armenians and
Turks, have ancient and well-known historical
roots. The present dispute between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh has clearly
affected Turkey's relations with Armenia. They
deteriorated in particular when in spring 1993
during the fighting over Kelbajar, Armenian forces
opened a second land corridor between Armenia
and Nagomo-Karabakh. Tiukey closed the air cor-
ridor to Armenia. It also stopped the free passage
of trains and aircraft for humanitarian aid when
Armenia occupied Kelbajar in April 1994.
77. Turkey recently stated that it is ready to
take steps aimed at building confidence in its rela-
tions with Armenia, but only on condition that
Armenia is willing to do the same. Officials of
both countries have met to discuss the issue. Tur-
key has declared that it will establish diplomatic
relations with Armenia only after the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from occupied Azeri territory.
It says that Arrnenia should also lift its objection
against Turkish participation in a planned multi-
national peace-keeping force for Nagorno-
Karabakh.
78. Turkey started preparing to ease its embar-
go on Armenia by reopening an air corridor allo-
wing delivery of United States humanitarian aid.
This development is said to be connected with the
Turkish bid, strongly supported by the United
States, for an oil pipeline which should link the oil
fields of Azerbaijan with Tirkey's Mediterranean
port of Ceyham, crossing Armenian territory'2.
(iv) The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
79. Nagorno-Karabakh, a region inhabited by
Armenians, was at[ached to Azerbaijan following
a decision taken by the Caucasian desk of the
communist parry in l92I.Later, in 1923, Nagor-
no-Karabakh obtained the status of autonomous
region of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azer-
baijan. For many years, there has been a policy of
Azerification. As a consequence, the share of
Armenians in its population diminished from 95Vo
in l92l to 7 5Eo in the early 1980s.
80. Stimulated by the perestrorka movement in
the Soviet Union, a resolution was adopted by the
Council of Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988
asking to be attached to Armenia. There were
11. International Herald Tribune, l9th April 1995.
12. Financial Times, 24th April 1995.
several anti-Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan in
1988 and 1990 and many Azeris left Armenia to
go to Azerbaijan. Altogether, an estimated
200 000 persons were forced into exile.
81. The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet suspended
Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomy in November
1991, but in December,l99l, the republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence fol-
lowing a referendum with 997o of the votes in
favour. ln 1992 fighting intensified into a full
scale war and the Azeri froops were soon forced
into retreat and defence. Violence and hostilities
since 1988 are said to have resulted in the deaths
of an estimated 25 000 soldiers and civilians and
the displacement of one million others'3. It is
thought that at present ethnic Armenian forces
occupy 10 000 square kilometres of Azerbaijan
territory including a strip of Azeri land dividing
the enclave from Armenia on top of the 4 400
square kilometres of Nagorno-Karabkh's territo-
ry. Although Armenia has denied involvement in
the conflict, both Turkey and Iran, but also increa-
singly Russia, have held Armenia responsible.
82. On 27th Jnly 1994, the Defence Ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the military leader
of Nagorno-Karabakh signed an agreement giving
legal status to, and indefinitely extending, a cease-
fire agreement reached in Moscow on 9th-11th
May 1994.
83. A meeting of the OSCE Minsk group'o in
Moscow on 9th-11th February 1995, did not
manage to smooth over the differences between
the parties concerned over the political statute of
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The emphasis
of Armenia on granting a political statute to
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, and its direct
participation in the negotiations seems to be a
major obstacle to reaching a comprehensive
agreement.
84. At the OSCE summit meeting in Budapest
on 6th December 1994, it was decided to send a
3 000 strong OSCE multinational peace-keeping
force to Nagorno-Karabakh. No agreement has
been reached yet over the composition of the
force, but it seems to be agreed that no one state
could contribute more than 30Vo of the troops.
Russia had earlier insisted that it should provide
most of the troops. The deployment of the peace-
keeping force will only take place if the cease-fire
will have been changed into a permanent truce and
after United Nations Security Council approval.
85. In fact, Turkey has its doubts about Rus-
sia's r6le in the conflict, being aware of Russia's
13. Human Rights Watch, Seven years of conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh, New York 1995.
14. The OSCE Minsk group consisting of a number of
OSCE member states, including Russia and Turkey and the
" interested " parties in Nagorno-Karabakh, started its peace
initiative in1992.
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strategic interests in the region, combined with its
desire to deploy troops in Azerbaijan. Russia has
made no secret of its intention to protect the sou-
thern frontiers of the former Soviet Union's terri-
tory against rising Islamism and to have an impor-
tant stake in the exploitation of Azerbaijan's oil
and its transport to the world markets.
86. Russia had made mediation efforts in the
conflict as early as September 199t, but these
were considerably stepped up at the expense of
the mediation activities of the Minsk group after
President Aliyev came to power in a military coup
in June 1993.
87. At the beginning of March 1995, however,
there were violent clashes between Armenia and
Azeri forces in the north of Azerbaijan 
- 
the hrst
important violation of the cease-fire in force since
May l994.In May 1995, however, on the occasion
of the one-year existence of the cease-fire agree-
ment, both parties exchanged prisoners of war.
(v) Conclusions
88. The Transcaucasian region, where Europe
and Asia meet, has always been considered of
great strategic importance by its direct neighbours
Russia, Turkey and han.
89. For Russia and later for the Soviet Union, it
was a buffer zone against the Muslim world in the
south, a concept which seems to be continued by
the new post-communist Russia. It considers
Transcaucasia as situated within its zone of
influence. Russia's objective is to have the CIS
recognised as a regional organisation in the fra-
mework of chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, which could be given a mandate to inter-
vene in the CIS by the Security Council, the inter-
vention being financed by the United Nations.
90. Although Azerbaijan has declared repea-
tedly that it does not want any foreign ffoops on
its soil, Russia, with President Aliyev's agree-
ment, is still using the huge early warning station
in Gubeli in north Azerbaijan which it certainly
would not like to give up, given the six years of
consffuction and $2 or $3 billion investment nee-
ded to reconstruct it elsewhere on Russian territo-
ry. At the same time, on 1lth June 1994, Azerbai-jan agreed with the Russian Defence Minister to
participate in a unified air defence system for
Trans-Caucasia.
9I. Because of their involvement in armed
conflicts, both Georgia and Armenia have had no
choice other than to give in to Russian pressure to
be allowed to deploy Russian troops on their terri-
tory. As a consequence, Russia has now deployed
divisions on Georgian and Armenian territory.
With the announcement in Moscow of the crea-
tion of the 58th army of northern Caucasus, there
will be even more Russian troops in the region.
Azerbaijan has not yet ceded to Russian pressure,
but it remains to be seen how long it will be able
to resist.
92. Turkey, which has narrow cultural and eco-
nomic relations with Azerbaijan, wishes before
anything else to prevent a resurgence of Russian
influence in Transcaucasia and in particular in
Azerbaijan. Both Turkey and Armenia are ffrying
to normalise their mutual relations, but Turkey
has made it clear that this would be possible only
if Armenians were to withdraw from occupied
Azeri territory because Turkish public opinion
would not allow any weakening of support for
Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Armenian
minority in Turkey will insist on Turkey recogni-
sing the 1915 genocide as a condition for reconci-
liation.
93. Iran knows that it has to act cautiously in
order not to create unrest among the 20 million
Azeris living in Northern Iran. While it is mode-
rately in favour of the Armenians, it is providing
humanitarian aid to the Azeri refugees of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict.
(b) The Central Asian repablics
94. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Turkey had hoped that the Central Asian
Turkic republics15 and the Transcaucasian repu-
blic of Azerbaijan, with which it shares cultural,
linguistic and religious ties, would form a sub-
regional bloc under Turkish leadership. Turkey
has now realised that expectations on both sides
were raised too high, acknowledging that it is
financially and technically unable to meet many
of the republic's needs. The state of the Turkish
economy does not allow for extensive aid pro-
grammes and the internal situation in the country,
with high inflation, growing lslamic fundamenta-
lism and the fight against Kurdish separatists,
demands prior attention.
95. Two " Turkish summits " have now been
held, the frst in Ankara in October 1992 and the
second in Istanbul on 18th-19th October 1994. A
third summit is planned to be held in Bishkek in
August 1995.
(c) The south-eastem neighbours
(i) Iran
Rivalries in Central Asia and the Caucasus
96. Turkey and kan are both close to the new
independent republics of the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia, on account of the existence of cultural,
historic and religious ties.
15. These republics are: Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Thrkmenis-
tan and Uzbekistan.
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97. Rivalry undeniably exists between Turkey
and Iran, particularly in Cenftal Asia which for
long has been the place of encounters and conflict
between the Turkish and Persian worlds. Russia's
hegemony has therefore been contested in what
was formerly its own exclusive sphere of influ-
ence over which Turkey and Iran are now
competing.
98. There is an awareness among the Tirrkish-
speaking peoples of Cenfral Asia that they belong
to the same cultural community.In the area, there
is, however, also a Farsi-speaking culture which
enjoys cultural prestige but is politically in the
minority.
99. Different ffends are evident from one for-
mer Soviet Republic to another. Generally spea-
king however Ttrkey wishes to see the repubtcs
become market economies and adopt a pro-wes-
tern political line. The message disseminated by
Ankara advocates a moderate Islamic view in
order counter the risk of a slide into radical Islam.
han, for its part, intends to promulgate the messa-
ge of Islam and export an ideology that is inde-
pendent of the West.
100. From the early 1990s, Ttukey has adopted
an approach that aims to increase commercial and
cultural exchanges with central Asia. Indeed Tir-
kish products dominate virtually all of the area's
markets.
101. Moreover Turkey is presenting the creation
of the Black Sea economic co-operation area16 as
the means of creating an area of regional political
stability facilitating its anchorage to the West
through economic and commercial integration.
I02. From the early nineties onwards, Iran, for
its part, has strengthened the regional dimension
of its economic diplomacy guided by the o'prag-
matic wing " of the r6gime. The Iranian strategy
therefore gives priority to winning back markets,
particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The
break-up of the Soviet Union gave new impetus to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
(OEC) which the Muslim republics of the former
Soviet Union joined at Tehran's suggestion. In
this way, Iran is in point of fact urying to create a
huge common Islamic market in the region.
103. Although Turkey is associated with the
OEC, it wants at the same time to play its own
hand. It made this clear by organising the first
summit meeting of Ttrkish speaking counties in
Istanbul in October 1992".
lM. These considerations show the stake repre-
sented by the region in the policy of influence
of two important countries harbouring the same
16. See Chapter VII of the present report.
17. The agreements conclude( however, were modest and
cautious.
regional ambitions and pursuing competing courses
of action.
105. Although many in the West are concerned
over Iranian influence in Central Asia, including
in particular the export of militant Islamism, it
should be noted that Iran has acted cautiously and
has concentrated on trade agreements and quite
successfully. It has signed a co-operation agree-
ment with Turkmenistan to lay a pipeline for the
transport of Turkmen gas through Iran to Europe.
It is also discussing an oil pipeline project with
Kazakhstan. Weekly flights between Central
Asian capitals and Tehran-have been established,
new border crossings opened, roads repaired and
new roads, railways and bridges are being prepa-
red. The main objective of Iran's policy in this
region is to prevent Turkey, and through it the
West, from gaining a foothold in the Central
Asian republics strong enough to pose a security
threat.
106. Notwithstanding the efforts made by both
states, competition between Iran and Turkey for
influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus
has been limited because both states lack the
resources to invest in the region in order to win
influence. Iran has not emphasised its ideological
or religious interests in Azerbaijan and Ttrrkme-
nistan. It has concentrated mainly on cultural and
economic links and transit agreements.
Azerbaijan
107. The most obvious of their rivalries sets Tur-
key and Iran on opposing sides as regards Azer-
barjan, which has a certain continuity in its links
both with Turkey and Iran and with central Asia.
A large part of Turkey's attention is in fact mono-
polised by Azerbaijan in relation to which Turkey
is able to claim ties of blood and a community of
language'8. Iran for its part emphasises shared
religion and the fact that ISVo of han's population
is Azeri.
108. Although 707o of the Azeri population are
Shiites, thus providing a certain link with Iran,
suspicion of religious fundamentalism is real and
the Iranian model is generally rejected. This fact
does not prevent Iran from making repeated
attempts to impose its presence in cultural, politi-
cal, economic, social and religious matters.
109. Indeed, it is the development model of the
Turkish non-secular state that has been adopted
by the Azerbaijan Government and the majority
of the Azeri population. This statement, however,
must be qualified insofar as the Islamic activism
coming from Turkey is far more clear-sighted
than that promoted by Iran'e.
The Azeris are Tiukish-speaking.
Cahiers de I'Orient, No. 30, 1993.
18.
19.
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110. As regards the conflict over Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, it should be noted that Iran is sfrongly in
favour of a peaceful solution because of concern
lest it spill over into its own territory and create
interest in its own large Azeri community.
111. Recently the signing in Bakou, of an agree-
ment between Turkey and Azerbaijan has streng-
thened Ankara's participation, to lran's disadvan-
tage in an oil consortium dominated by American
and British companies for exploiting the rich
deposits of the Caspian seam.
ll2. The substantial progress Turkey has made
in the Caucasus relies heavily on firm American
diplomatic support, one of the most prominent
concerns of which is to stem the spread of Islam.
It is a matter of avoiding destabilisation at local
levels that might draw in the whole of Central
Asia and creating a centre of stability through the
emergence ofa regional power, Turkey, as a coun-
terweight to Iran's ascendency.
The Kurdish problem
113. The Kurdish question contributes to bring-
ing Iran and Turkey closer together. The flow of
Kurdish refugees to the Iranian frontier in Decem-
ber 1991 obliged Ttrrks and Iranians to co-operate
to find a solution to this thorny problem.
II4. Although Turkish military intervention
against PKK camps is intended to crush the sour-
ce of what Thrkey considers to be dangerous des-
tabilisation, Iran's publicly-stated objective is
rather to eliminate the risk of contamination.
115. The two countries are generally in step
regarding the Kurdish question. The Islamic
Republic seems to have assumed a permanent
right of pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas into haqi ter-
ritory.
116. Like Turkey, Iraq rejects the idea of an
autonomous Kurdistan that might one day be-
come an independent entity and, according to
Iran, threaten the internal situation in the country.
ll7. The country's artillery and airforce conse-
quently inflict numerous raids at regular intervals
against the areas which, according to the authori-
ties in Tehran, are harbouring Kurdish rebels, an
allegation which the Iraqi Kurds have always
denied. It seems that, like Turkey, Iran remains
determined to arouse fear among its opponents.
118. While a matter of shared concerr, the Kur-
dish question also constitutes a factor of tension
and hostility between Turkey and kan. Turkish
policy and initiatives towards the Middle East
remained relatively low-key in 1993 and 1994,
except in relation to questions having a more or
less direct influence on the Kurdish problem. Tur-
key, Iran and Syria have been meeting regularly
since their summit meeting of 14th November
1992in order to review the position of those refer-
red to by Tlrkey as the PKK terrorists. The Turk-
ish authorities strongly suspect Syria and Iran of
using them to weaken Turkey. At the same time,
the repeated tripartite summit meetings confirm
that the views of the three countries converge on
this point, fearing that the process of adminis-
trative autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan might lead to
a contagious dismemberment.
119. Lastly, Iran's reaction to the TUrkish mili-
tary intervention in March 1995 has been muted
and cautious. Tehran has in fact asked for the
" withdrawal " of Tirkish forces from kaq. Iranian
radio also announced that the presence of Turkish
troops in Iraq was likely to complicate further the
situation in the region. This position is supported
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ali
Akbar Velayati. The Iranian President for his part
has merely stated the importance Iran attaches to
Iraq's territorial integrity.
Interior developments and the restructuring and
modernisation of I ran's armed force s
120. Under President Rafsanjani, the Iranian
Government is concentrating its efforts on revita-
lising the shattered economy by introducing mea-
sures of liberalisation and openings to western
markets. Consolidation of the Islamic republic at
home is the government's priority. The aggressive
and radical foreign policy, combined with stre-
nuous efforts to export the revolution by intrigue
and force, have been toned down considerably.
The failure of the government's policy to improve
the country's economic situation and the popula-
tion's fiving standards has increased the influence
of radical Islamists and the conservative religious
faction, but President Rafsanjani is still firmly in
power and has only had to make limited conces-
sions to the conservatives.
l2l. The United States continues its efforts to
isolate Iran because of its alleged support of terro-
rist groups, opposition to Middle East peace talks
and search for a nuclear capability. On the other
hand, it should be noted that American oil compa-
nies, buying an estimated 800 000 barrels a day of
Iranian crude oil (roughly a quarter of Iran's total
output), are the largest purchasers of Iranian oil
and American companies are the sixth largest
trading partner for Iran.
122. Feeling uncomfortable with many of its
neighbours and having learned the lessons ofthe
Iraq-Iran war and of the coalition victory over
Iraq, Iran is now implementing a programme to
modernise and professionalise its armed forces.
Forced by economic and financial p-roblems, the
programme envisages the creation of smaller and
more professional armed forces. A re-equipment
prograrnme is under way with Russia, China and20. See chapter[(b).
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North Korea as the main suppliers. Priorities are
the upgrading of armoured warfare capabilities,
the building of a modern airforce, enhanced ability
to deny access to the Gulf to hostile shipping and
the expansion of its surface-to-surface missile
arsenal.
L23. It is said that the Iranian Government
considers effective armed forces a vital instru-
ment to protect the counfiry while the social and
economic reconstruction of the country is taking
place.
124. In particular, the United States has strongly
criticised the procurement of three " kilo " class
diesel-electric submarines from Russia. It should
be noted, however, that these submarines will be
of only limited value, their crews being trained
only for limited sub-surface deployments, while
they are vulnerable to modern anti-submarine
warfare forces. They may, however, play an
important r6le in a strategy of denial and naval
guerrilla warfare in the Gulf. Iran has stationed
troops equipped with surface-to-surface and sur-
face-to-air missiles on islands located near the
Strait of Hormuz which could, in combination
with other military activities, threaten the free
flow of oil from the Gulf to the western world.
I25. Following its experience in the Iran-Iraq
war, where its troops suffered from chemical
attacks, Iran has now developed a fulI offensive
and defensive warfare capability with various
delivery systems, including artillery shells, air-
craft spray tanks and missile warheads. Biological
weapons production is under way.
126. There has been no proof of an imminent
Iranian military nuclear capability, but there can
be little doubt that the country has an interest in
researching the possibility of such a capability.
Recent experience has shown that Iraq and Norttt
Korea have also been able to hide their military
programmes from IAEA inspections.
127. Russia, China and Pakistan have signed
peaceful nuclear co-operation agreements with
Iran. The resulting prograrnmes, however, may
help it to produce plutonium, a key component for
nuclear warheads. Nuclear technology has also
been acquired from some European companies
and from former Soviet republics such as Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. On
the other hand, Iran has yet to build a nuclear
reactor that can be used to develop the main com-
ponents for nuclear weapons and it is still lacking
essential missile technology.
128. Russia has signed a contract to help Iran
with the completion of a nuclear reactor at
Bushelvi on the Gulf coast and it intends to build
at least two more nuclear reactors in kan in the
near future. Recent efforts by the United States to
put pressure on Russia to stop selling nuclear
technology to Iran have failed. While the United
States has accused Iran of being engaged in a
" crash prograrnme " to acquire nuclear weapons,
Russia argues that the United States is protecting
its own ffade and nuclear industry and is trying to
prevent competitors to do business on Iran's capa-
cious market2'.
129. At the recent United States-Russian sum-
mit meeting in Moscow on 10th May 1995, Presi-
dent Yeltsin has declared that Russia would sepa-
rate the " military aspects of its nuclear conffact
with Iran from the 'peaceful ones' ". As a conse-
quence, Russia will abandon plans to sell Iran a
gas centrifuge, but it remains committed to the
sale of at least trvo lighrwaEr nuclear reactors.
130. The United States is also trying to persuade
China to renounce from negotiations on a contract
to provide Iran with two 300 megawatt nuclear
reactors. China has rejected the United States'
arguments, declaring that it acts in accordance
with international practice and that there is no law
forbidding such co-operation 22.
131. On 30th April 1995, the United States Pre-
sident, Bill Clinton, announced a total ban on all
United States trade and investment links with
Iran, accusing Iran of heavily sponsoring terro-
rism and having embarked upon a crash program-
me to develop nuclear weapons. ln 1994, United
States exports to Iran amounted to a total of $326
million, and its oil companies purchased Iranian
oil for a total of $4 billion. Secretary of State War-
ren Christopher called on other nations to " end
all of their concessionary credits, which allow
Iran to divert scarce resources to military pro*
grarnmes and to sponsoring terrorism "r.
132. Governments of European Union member
states havg not reacted favourably to the United
States call for a trade embargo. They have com-
mitted themselves to a " critical dialogue " while
maintaining trade relations, taking the view that
isolation will not help to make Iran change its
behaviour. In general, Turkey agrees with the
European Union member states' view and it is not
planning to follow the United States example. At
the very moment the United States decided on its
trade embargo, Turkey announced its agreement
with Iran according to which Iran will supply
2 billion cubic mefres of natural gas per year from
1998, 8 billion from 2001 and 10 billion from
2002.The agreement was concluded for 23 years
and includes the construction of a gas pipeline.
133. It is noted here that the restructuring of
han's armed forces and the implementation of the
re-equipment programme will take some time and
21. International Herald Tribune, l8th March and l0th April
1995.
22. I*Monde, t9th April 1995, International Herald Tribu-
ne, 30th March 1995.
23. International Herald Tribune, 2nd May 1995.
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the country does not constitute an immediate mili-
tary threat to its neighbours. Moreover, the whole
prograrnme is mainly directed at creating a deter-
rent against a possible new Iraqi aggression while
it is also making an effort to balance the massive
arms procurement programmes of many Gulf
states after the war against Iraq.
Conclusion
134. There can be no doubt that with its geogra-
phical location, natural resources and large popu-
lation, Iran is an important power in the region
and an imporrant neighbour of Turkey.
135. In spite of differences in political systems,
relations between the two countries strengthened
after the end of the cold war. Turkey is the most
important channel for Iranian imports from the
West. After a fall in bilateral trading in 1986-87,
trade recovered from the early 1990s.
136. Turkey's policy is to maintain good rela-
tions with Iran on the basis of non-interference in
internal affairs and mutual respect. It believes that
this will serve the bilateral interests of the two
countries and contribute to peace and stability in
this volatile region. The Turkish Government
wishes to engage in bilateral and regional co-ope-
ration with Iran which could be a positive contri-
bution to improving the climate in the region.
With this understanding, Turkey wishes to enhan-
ce its co-operation with Iran within the Economic
Co-operation Organisation which it considers as a
purely economic institution'0.
137. As with Syria, Thrkey has established with
Iran a mechanism to maintain a continuous dia-
logue on border security issues and on the ques-
tion of terrorism. This mechanism has been insti-
tutionalised through a joint committee between
the Ministries of the Interior of the two countries
and a high security commission. It has resulted in
an improvement in co-operation between the two
countries on border security issues.
138. The frequent tripartite meetings held over
the last two years between kan, Syria and Turkey
also include an economic dimension concerning
the development of trade between the two coun-
tries in the framework of an attempt to normalise
their relations.
139. Since the strengthening of President Raf-
sandjani's powers, Iranian propaganda has beco-
me rather more muted than in the past. Turkey
nevertheless continues to regard lran as a rival
regional power, capable, when in its own interest,
of intensifying its policy of intervention in the
internal affairs of Turkey.
24. Tvkey is associated with the Economic Co-operation
Organisation, which was reactivated by kan in 199l-1992,
Pakistan being the other participant and the Central Asian
republics having been invited to participate.
(ii) Iraq
P e rsistence of the Kurdish problem and the Turkish
intervention of March 1995
140. In the 1970s and far into the 1980s, Tirrkey
and Iraq have practised some form of tacit, and
even sometimes overt, military co-operation in
their struggle against Kurdish nationalism. In
October 1984, both countries concluded a " hot
pursuit " agreement which allowed each side to
" pursue subversive groups in the territory of the
other up to five kilomeffes ".
141,. Afterhaving been excluded from the Ttrkish
Syrian economic agreement in 1987, which also
included a guarantee on the Euphrates water flow
to Syria, Iraq changed its co-operative attitude
and from 1988 the PKK operated at will from
Northern Iraqi territory. In the aftermath of the
Gulf war, more than 400 000 Kurds who were
living in Iraq fled into Thrkey. Since 1992, Turkey
has made frequent incursions into Iraqi territory in
order to destroy the PKK facilities in northern
Iraq.
142. Ever since April 1991, the United States,
France and the United Kingdom, operating from
Turkish territory, have imposed an air exclusion
zone on the forces of Baghdad, thus denying the
kaqi army overflight of the Kurdish zone situated
north of the 36th parallel. Finally united, the Iraqi
opposition ratified the existence of a " federate "
Kurdish state at the Salaheddin congress in Octo-
ber 1992. Neighbouring states, Turkey, Iran and
Syria, warned the Kurds at that time against any
desire for independence, but the existence of a
Kurdish enclave where the Iraqi Government
could not exert its authority obliged the protecting
forces to allow for the setting up of a political pro-
cess leading to the creation of a central adminis-
tration for this region.
143. After a May 1992 general election for the
legislative council of the Kurdistan autonomous
region in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) of Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, setting
aside rivalries, formed a coalition government. In
the spring of 1994, this coalition fell apart when
the KDP was accused of pocketing customs duties
levied on truck transports from Iraq to Turkey and
the PUK in revenge fleeing with the Central
Bank's deposits. Since then, the two factions have
been openly fighting each other with an intemrp-
tion between August and December and a formal
cease-fire agreement in November 1994 which
also resulted in a new coalition cabinet. In
December 1994, hostilities started again and Irbil,
the capital of haq's Kurdish enclave was occupied
by the PUK. In mid-February 1995, the KDP star-
ted an unsuccessful offensive to expel the rival
PUK from hbil. Negotiation offers fromPresident
Saddam Hussein were rejected by both sides.
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11H. It should be recalled that since the end of
1992,the Tirkish army, with the collaboration of
the Kurdish Peshmergas of Iraq, has undertaken
military operations on Iraqi territory in order to
flush out the PKK militants from their Iraqi bases.
These offensives did not prevent the militants of
that party from returning to occupy the mountains
along the border between Ttrrkey and Iraq.
145. From then on, close co-operation has been
established between Tirkey and the kaqi Kurds,
especially with the Kurdish democratic party(KDP) to prevent PKK attacks against Turkey
from Iranian territory.
146. In March 1994, the lraqi authorities devi-
sed a plan for forcing a passage between Nossoul
and the Thrkish border so as at one and the same
time to isolate Kurdish resistance and to break the
international embargo. Contingents from the
Republican Guard were massed at the edge of the
"security zote", ready for action with the pro-
bable connivance of the Iranian and Turkish
armies. The rise in tension increased Turkey's
embarrassment which, although a country on
which the plan hinges, nevertheless intends to
manage the Kurdish problem according to its own
sffategic interests.
147. Several times since February 1994, the Tiu-
kish Government has stated that Turkey would
not tolerate the instability caused by the fighting
between the KDP and PUK, fearing that the PKK
might take advantage of it to reorganise in the
mountain area on the Thrkish-Iranian border.
148. The Ttrkish authorities stated that this option
did not threaten haq's tenitorial integrity. Tirkey
feared that generalised warfare between the diffe-
rent Kurdish factions in haq might lead to a mass-
ive new exodus of Iraqi Kurds into its territory.
149. It also suspected the PUK of allowing the
PKK, which has several camps in Iraqi Kurdistan,
a degree of liberry. The Tlrkish authorities have
long been concerned over the possibility of PKK
fighters infiltrating Turkey and use this as a justi-
fication for the need to " neufralise them before
they try to cross the border "r.
150. On 20th March, the Turkish authorities
decided on a massive intervention by their army
into Iraqi territory and launched a huge military
operation in pursuit of the PKK insurgent forces.
The area of intervention of the 35 000 men and the
Turkish airforce was located inside the exclusion
zone defined in 1991.
151. Immediately afterthe beginning of the Tlr-
kish military intervention, the entire range of poli-
tical parties, from the nationalist far right (NI{P)
to the opposite extreme (Democratic Party of the
Left, DSP), stated that it is in favour of maintai-
ning Turkish troops in northern lraq. The Tirkish
hime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, for her part maintai-
ned her initial message stating that the aim is to
" bring this operation to an end (...) once the
region is rid of the terrorists and the camps have
been destroyed ".
152. The legal and political instability that the
allies maintain in Iraq has always disturbed T[r-
key which has often stated its preference for the
territorial integrity of kaq 16 fos rnainrained as a
bulwark against the development of a Kurdish
administration that might lead to the emergence of
an independent Kurdistan.
153. The Tirkish authorities consequently want
a reconciliation between the Iraqi Kurds and the
Baghdad govemment26. Turkey considers that it is
necessary to pacrfy conflict between Iraqi Kurds
so that Ttrkey can establish new forms of co-oper-
ation with them. According to the forrner Turkish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr._Karayalsin, dis-
cussions are in progress between Baghdad and the
Iraqi Kurds. Battling with the problem of instabi-
lity in the North of Iraq, Turkey is turning to the
Iraqi Kurds with a view to reviving the agreement
signed with them ta 1992 after the joint offensive
against the PKK 2'. Moreover, a senior Turkish
official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated
in early April that his government intended to
give responsibility for Ttrkishflraqi border secu-
rity to the group led by Massoud Barzari, Head of
the KDR after the withdrawal of his own troops28.
Renewed contacts between Tlrkey and the Iraqi
Kurds is not to Baghdad's liking and the latter has
severely criticised Turkey for entering into dis-
cussion with " traitorous and illegal Kurdish
gangs ".
154. The Iraqi reaction in the face of the Tlrkish
mititary operation boiled down to condemnation
by Baghdad of the invasion of the Iraqi zone by its
neighbour's army. Iraq regarded the operation as
" a violation of its sovereignty " and oo an attack
on its territorial integdty " D.The Baghdad autho-
rities therefore demanded the withdrawal of the
Turkish army, in parallel with the cessation of
American interference. For Baghdad, Turkey
belongs, moreover, to the pro-western circle. Iraq
maintains that is feels hemmed in " by an unequal
confrontation to the North and East with two non-
Arab powers, Turkey and Iran "30.
26. T[rkey wants the autonomy agreement Saddam Hussein
signed with the Kurds in 1970 and 1974 to be implemented.
27. I*Monde, 13th April 1995.
28. In 1992 a decision was taken to create joint border
control posts but it was never followed up.
29. Statement issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
baq,22ndMarch 1995.
30. Perceptions de s6curit6 et strat6gies nationales au
Moyen-Orient, edited by B. Kodmani Darnish, IFRI.
25. Mr. Suleyman Demirel, President of the Republic of Tur-
key, tr Monde,23rd November 1992.
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155. At the end of April 1995, Turkey withdrew
20 000 roops from Iraqi territory declaring that ttre
army had succeeded in its mission to wipe out PKK
camps, arms depots and supply routes. On 4ttr May,
it was announced that the remaining troops across
the far eastern part of the border were also with-
drawn. Turkey recognised, however, that it would
not be an easy task to keep control of the mountai-
nous border area. This subject was discussed with a
high-ranking Iraqi-Kurdish delegation visiting
Ankara on 3rd and 4ttr May 1995.
156. Although Turkey has always maintained
that the territorial integrity of Iraq was not in
doubt, President Suleyman Demirel surprised
many when, on 2nd May 1995, he declared that
T[rkey would like to correct its frontier line with
Iraq in order to ensure its impermeability. He
added that the new frontier should follow the foot
of the mountains on Iraqi territory and include the
province of Mosul, which Turkey had given up in
l926,burt which according to the President, " still
belongs to Turkey "3'.
157. Iraq immediately reacted by saying that it
had no intention whatsoever to discuss frontier
changes with Turkey and that it would oppose any
possible unilateral Turkish decision on this sub-ject " with all legitimate means'0.
158. The Arab League strongly deplored Presi-
dent Demirel's declaration which " might worsen
tension in the region " and it reaffirmed its attach-
ment to the territorial integnty of [raq,2.
Economic relations and the United Nations trade
embargo
159. Economic relations between Turkey and
Iraq thrived during the 1980s when Tlrkey beca-
me the principal conduit for Iraqi oil exports
while receiving 60Vo of its oil supplies from Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was also a tremendous stimulus
for the growth of trade between the two countries.
Iraq was Turkey's principal trade partner in the
region until the outbreak of the Gulf war.
160. The United Nations embargo against Iraq
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait therefore
had serious consequences for the Turkish econo-
my. The Iraq-Turkey pipeline from Kirkuk to
Ceyhan was shut down and has since remained
closed. At the moment, Iraqi-Turkish negotiations
are being held on the possible repair and eventual
re-opening of the pipeline.
16I. Turkey has fully observed the United
Nations trade embargo against Iraq since it came
into force in August 1990 following haq's inva-
sion of Kuwait. According to government state-
ments, because of lost trade with Iraq, Turkey
has missed business opportunities amounting to
$20 bitlion. The economic aid promised by-the
West " is reaching it only in dribs and drabs ",3.
Turkey, like Russia, France and China, has stated
that it would like to see a graduated response to
Iraq's graduated compliance with United Nations
resolutions which are aimed at ridding Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction and of its ability to
build such weapons.
162. It recently became known that, although
near to full compliance with the United Nations
resolutions on nuclear and chemical weapons,
Iraq has acquired enough growth or diagnostic
media to cultivate up to 3.3 tons of bacteria which
could be used for biological weapons. Moreover,
the United States has been able to demonstrate
that Iraq has rebuilt factories capable ofproducing
chemical weapons or missiles.
163, On 13th March 1995, the United Nations
Security Council decided to maintain economic
sanctions against Iraq because it had not yet com-
plied with United Nations resolutions.
164. The United Kingdom and the United States
argue that a broader judgment should be made of
Iraq's overall record of compliance with United
Nations resolutions, including Resolution 688
which demanded an end to the repression of the
Iraqi civilian population and even oflraq's likely
behaviour if sanctions are lifted.
165. On 12th April 1995, the commission whose
task is to verify Iraqi compliance with United
Nations resolutions presented a report to the Secu-
rity Council in which among other things it said:
" The only conclusion that can be drawn is
that there is a high risk that they [items and
materials required to produce in Iraq biolo-
gical warfare agentsl had been purchased
and in part used for proscribed purposes
- 
the production of agents for biological
weapons. "
t66. Ttvo days later, the United Nations Security
Council voted unanimously to offer Iraq easier
terms under which to sell oil to meet its urgent
need for medicine, food and other relief goods.
Part of the revenue of the oil sale was to be ear-
marked for the establishment of a compensation
fund for victims of the invasion of Kuwait and for
paying the costs of United Nations monitors wat-
ching Iraq's compliance with United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Another part of the
revenue was to be used for cleaning and mainte-
lqnce of the oil pipeline from Iraq to T[rkey's
Mediterranean coast port Yumurtalik.
167. Iraq promptly rejected the oil sale proposal,
reportedly because president Saddam Hussein
31.
32.
Le Monde, llth May 1995
L,eMonde, llthMay 1995.
2t
33. t,e r6le g6osrrategique de la Tirrquie, edited by D. Bil-
Iion,IRIS, 1995.
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feared that limited oil sales would undermine his
campaign for the ful1removal of sanctions'. On
12th May 1995, the United Nations Security
Council again confirmed the maintenance of the
embargo.
168. A continuation of the sanctions will most
probably not help to improve stability in the
region. Although President Saddam Hussein's
rdgime may still hold power for some time with
the backing of its security services, loyalists in the
Ba'ath party and its Tihriti power base, the econo-
mic crisis will certainly undermine its authority.
At present, however, there seems to be no viable
alternative r6gime. A collapse of Saddam Hus-
sein's r6gime could therefore easily lead to a dis-
solution of Iraq into its Sunni, Shi'a and Kurd
component parts. This would cause both Tirkey
and Iran, in turn, to intervene. Neither of these
countries could tolerate the existence of an inde-
pendent Kurdish entity. Turkey would no doubt
seek to control the Kurds in northern Iraq. Iran
would try to dominate the Shi'a south where a
power struggle might develop between the Iraqi
National Congress seeking a broad-based coali-
tion involving secular and Sunni groups and the
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SAIRI) which is ultimately committed to
creating an Islamic republic in southern kaq. The
lsrnaining Sunni part of Iraq with the still consi-
derable national armed forces in its hands, would
no doubt try to reassert confiol over both northern
and southern parts of the country.
169. In conclusion, it should be noted that in the
case of continued sanctions against Iraq, pros-
pects for stability are gnm. Turkey's position in
favour of lifting the sanctions at least partly is
understandable.
(iii) Syria
l7O. Although there are no longer any major dis-
putes between Turkey and Syria, a number of
disagreements and tensions still exist preventing
true normalisation of the relations between the
two countries from being achieved. These consist
specifically of the territorial dispute over the
Sandjak of Alexandretta, the water issue, dealt
with in Chapter VI of the present report and sup-
port for the PKK.
The territorial dispute
l7l. The most rivial question and that of least
concern relates to the Sandjak of Alexandretta.
Syria has not forgotten the loss of this territory
today largely Arab-speaking, over which it still
maintains a claim.
172. Part of the Ottoman province of Syria
under French mandate, the territory was ceded to
Turkey in 1939 in the framework of the policy
granting guarantees against Germany. Syria has
never recognised this annexation. However,
although the Sandjak of Alexandretta still appears
on military maps as part of national territory, it no
longer seems to represent a serious source of disa-
greement and is ultimately only one factor contri-
buting to hostility in Turkistr/Syrian relations.
The Kurdish question
173. Since the start of the conflict with the PKK,
the Turkish authorities have subscribed to the
theory that the source of the problem in question
is external. ln their view, it should be possible to
crush the Kurdish rebellion rapidly if the latter
were cut offfrom is bases in the Lebanese Bekaa
valley, Syria and Iraq.
174. It is true that for many years Syrian leaders
have provided real support to the PKK which had
originally formed close links with the PLO and
the frst PKK fighters were trained in Lebanon.
After the expulsion of the Palestinians from Leba-
non in 1982, * the inheritance passed to Syria " 3s
in particular because with the territorial dispute
with Turkey.
175. After the signing in 1987 of a protocol of
agreement on securiry matters between Turkey
and Syria, the Syrian authorities exhibited a
degree of caution before renewing their support to
the PKK. Five years later, hoping to reach an
agreement more easily and isolated by the dislo-
cation of the Soviet Empire, Turkey renewed its
diplomatic initiatives, stating again that " the
licence given by Syria to the PKK terrorists was
not acceptable "36.
176. According to one point of view widely held
in Tiukey, Syria is specifically motivated by terri-
torial claims on certain parts of South-East Tir-
key and in particular the Hatay region.
177. Turkey sought a negotiated solution with
Damascus. The two countries decided to sffeng-
then their good-neighbourly relations according
to principles of mutual respect and non-interven-
tion in domestic affairs. This took the form of an
agreement, signed in April 1992, comprising per-
manent exchange of information in various fields,
with a view to the fight against terrorism, inclu-
ding mutual security, particularly as regards a
military settlement of the Kurdish question. This
policy also tends towards the closer rapproche-
ment that Turkey wants to pursue with the Muslim
world.
178- It was furthermore decided, following the
visit by Turkish Government authorities to
35.
36.
M. Vassier, Cahiers de l'Orient, No. 30.
Suleyman Demirel.34. International Herald Tribune, lTth April 1995.
22
DOCTIMENT 1465
Damascus in April 1992, that the Bekaa camps
would be outlawed. Nevertheless, although the
Mahsum Karkmoz military Academy has def,rni-
tely been closed, other camps have been opened
elsewhere.
179. Furthermore, despite the signing in April
1994 of a protocol according to which it agrees to
halt its aid to the PKK, Syria appears to have
begun once again to support this organisation in
more discreet manner. Of all the countries suspec-
ted of supporting the PKK, Syria is the one which
has provided the most frequent and regular sup-
port to terrorist groups operating in Turkey, while
keeping the risks ofa serious deterioration in rela-
tions between the two states under conffol.
Conclusions
180. In summary, apart from the conflict over
water exacerbated by Syria's support for the PKK,
Turkey, owing to its economic and military
weight, its water resources, its sktus as an ally of
the United States, its interest in the future of Iraq
and in the development of its relations with Israel,
is perceived by Syria as a major player in relation
to which it will need to reorganise its strategy.
However this may be, as matters now stand,
recent normalisation of Turkish-Syrian relations
is still superhcial, indeed has little credibility.
181. Probably Syria will maintain this indirect
pressure on Turkey until the balance of forces
shifts in its favour, enabling it to exact a number
of claims, including those in connection with
water, and even territory. It should therefore be
emphasised that a great deal more will be required
to defuse the deep-seated suspicion arising from
seventy years of open hostility between Turkey
and Syria.
I82. The Kurdish question is likely to remain a
major factor in the conflict that still persists in
spite of exchanges of visits by ministers. It is
highly unlikely that PresidentHafezEl Assad will
let go of such a trump card. The PKK is too
valuable an asset for Syria to dispose of it lightly,
even more so given that many Syrian Kurds are
fighting in the ranks of the PKK3'. The Syrian
President has found an outlet for the Synan Kurds
and at the same time has a means of pressurising
its Turkish neighbour which is more powerful and
has better backing than Syria.
(d) The Balluns
183. The present conflict in former Yugoslavia
has clearly brought to the fore Tirrkey's interest in
the Balkans. The extension of the Ottoman empi-
37. Ot the I 500-2 000 PKK acrivists thar were forced to
leave their bases on the TurkisMraqi border in November
1992, one third were Syrian.
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re over a large part of the Balkans for many cen-
turies has left fiaces of a long corlmon history in
many aspects of Balkan life, culture, population
and religion.
184. Turkey estimates that in the entire Balkans,
there are almost two million persons of Turkish
origin, not all of them Muslims, and that, of its
total population, about nine million are Muslims.
185. It is extremely difficult to make a reliable
estimate, given the fact that many demographic
data are not up to date, while mass migrations
caused by ethnic cleansing have contributed to
much confusion. The following figures neverthe-
less provide an approximate picture of the distri-
bution of Muslims and ethnic Turks in different
Balkan states.
AlbaniasE
population: 3 t82417 (census 1989)
3.3 million
(government estimate 1991)
Muslims: During communist rule, there
was a ban on worship. Accord-
ing to L945 data,72.87o of the
population was Muslim.
Bosnia-Herzegovinase
population: 4 364 572 (1991 census)
Muslims: 43.7Vo (1991 census) = 1 907 318(this includes a small number
of ethnic Albanian and Tiukish
Muslims). Most of these Mus-
lims are Bosniaks, a Serbo-
Croat-speaking people who
adopted Islam during the Otto-
man occupation.
Bulgariaq
population: 8 989 165 (1990 data)
Turks: 8.5Vo (198I data) - 764 079,
if applied to 1990 population
Muslims: l3%o (L98lestimate) = 1 168 591,
if applied to 1990 population
FYROM 4I
population: 1936877 (census 1994)
Turks: 77 500
Muslims: 582200
38. Source: Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States 1994, Europe Publications Ltd., London
1994.
39. Source: See footnote 38.
40. Source: see footnote 38.
41. Source: Govemment of FYROM.
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Romania
Turks: 55 000
(official government data)
Federal Republic of Yugoslaviae
population: l0 406 742 (1991 census)
Muslims: +l-20Vo
(1991 census) = 2 081 348
Of these Muslims, lTVo were
ethnic Albanians and 37o Slav
Muslims.
(i) The conflict informer Yugoslavia
186. When the crisis in former Yugoslavia was
still at an early stage in 1991, Turkey insisted on
the maintenance of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia within its then existing borders. After it had
become clear that a continuation of the former sta-
tus quo was no longer possible, Turkey recogni-
sed the four new independent republics without
making any distinction.
187. In the present conflict, Turkey has always
strongly criticised the Serbs, arguing that their
violent and aggtessive methods for incorporating
territory by force and creating new artificial fault
lines between different ethnic communities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina could easily lead to further
destabilisation and new conflicts. Turkey takes
the view that the multi-ethnic and multi-religious
society which has always been a characteristic of
the Balkan society, should be preserved. It is a
sfrong supporter of the federation between Croats
and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a confe-
deration between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na. The contact group's peace plan is considered
the best possible basis for peace in Bosnia-Herze-
govina and, in that framework, Turkey has played
an active r6le as a go-between for the Islamic
conference, of which it is a member, and the
contact goup.Turkey has repeated time and again
that the Serbs should not be rewarded with terri-
tory taken by force.
188. When, in September 1992,it was decided
to send a United Nations humanitarian protection
force (UNPROFOR) to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tur-
key immediately offered to send ffoops, but due to
hesitations on the part of United Nations Securiry
Council members, their deployment was authori-
sed only two years later, in surlmer 1994. Ntoge-
ther, the Turkish contribution to UNPROFOR is
about 1 500 troops. At present, a Turkish battalion
of 500 troops is deployed inZ,encha. One of the
battalion's frst activities of great symbolic value
was the restoration of the local Christian church.
In the framework of operation Deny Flight, Tirkey
placed eighteen aircraft at the disposat of NATO.
189. The arms embargo against Bosnia-Herze-
govina, which is part of the arms embargo against
all republics of former Yugoslavia, imposed by
the United Nations Security Council's Resolution
713 of 25th September 1991, has been the subject
of a proffacted dispute between the allies.
190. Turkey has been in favour of earlier propo-
sals to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and at the same time use the possibility
of air strikes against Serbian positions. In June
1993, a draft resolution to lift the embargo, which
was presented to ttre Security Council by non-ali-
gned and Muslim countries, was defeated. New
United States initiatives to that end in surnmer
1994 were opposed by European Union member
states and Russia. Although it was admitted that
the embargo included an element of injustice for
the Bosnians, whose equipment is inferior to the
Serb's equipment in quality and numbers, it was
argued that lifting the embargo would cause more
problems than advantages for the Bosnians. Lif-
ting the embargo, it was argued, would cause the
withdrawal of three quarters, if not all, of the
UNPROFOR troops, reunite all the Serbs in the
different republics of former Yugoslavia, ruin the
cohesion of the five states participating in the
contact group and further destabilise the situation
in that region.
191. After proposing, in September 1994, post-
poning the possible raising of the embargo, the
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, has since adopted
a " stop-go " attitude. on 11th November, the
United States announced that its naval ships in the
Adriatic would no longer monitor the embargo
against Bosnia. The resumption of hostilities
since the beginning of May 1995 causedthe United
Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, to urge a " fundamental review " of the
LINPROFOR mission.
I92. It should be noted that recent events have
reinforced the existing popular support for raising
the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but it seems that at present, the Turkish govern-
ment, in general, is in line with the opinion of the
contact group and there are no major differences
with the European Union over policy towards the
conflict in former Yugoslavia.
(ii) Bilgarta
193. Following a period of fairly stable relations
during the communist era, Thrkey's relations with
Bulgaria sharply deteriorated with effect from 1984
due to a forced assimilation campaign aimed at the
roughly over one million strong Turkish commu-
nity, which was then carried out by the communist
government under Todor Jivkov. Ethnic Turks
were forced to give up their Turkish-Islamic
identity for a new Bulgarian one. Some resisted
and lost their lives, others were detained. Around
300 000 Turks were forced to flee to Turkey.42. Source: see footnote 38.
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194. Later on, in the climate of glasnost and per-
estroika that began to prevail in Eastern Europe,
this much criticised campaign became an impor-
tant factor in accelerating the downfall of the
communist government in November 1989.
195. The new Bulgarian Government under the
leadership of President Jelyu Jelev, admitted that
the policy of assimilation was a graye political
mistake and declared its will to restore the rights
of the Turkish minority and to correct the wrong-
doings of the past.
196. As Bulgaria moved towards democracy,
Turkish-Bulgarian relations improved rapidly.
This positive development was marked by mutual
high-level visits. Since the establishment of a
democratic government in this country, Turkey
and Bulgaria have signed a number of basic
agreements and documents, such as the treaty of
friendship, good-neighbourly relations, co-opera-
tion and security of May l992,the Sofia and Edir-
ne documents on security and confidence-buil-
ding measures of December l99l and November
1992 afi a number of economic and technical
agrcements. The Edirne document deals in parti-
cular with the following issues: 1. confidence-
and security-building in the areas adjacent to the
common border; 2. increased sharing of military
information; 3. promotion of military contacts.
197. In the framework of Turkish-Bulgarian
military co-operation agreements, the Turkish and
Bulgarian navies have conducted joint mine exer-
cises and search and rescue exercises. Moreover,
the two countries have made positive progress in
new negotiations on their sea border, which had
been in stalemate for many years.
198. The socialist government under Prime
Minister Jan Videnov, which acceded to power
following the general elections on 18th December
1994, has so far signalled no changes of policy
towards Turkey.
199. After the downfall of the communists, the
Turkish minority gained their democratic rights.
Some of its day-to-day problems were solved.
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF),
a predominantly Turkish political party, at present
occupies 15 seats in the Bulgarian Parliament.
200. Turkey stipulates, however, that the rights
of minorities in Bulgaria have not been secured by
specific legal means, since the Bulgarian constitu-
tion makes no reference to minority rights. It has
also noted that despite remarkable improvement,
there is still discrimination against minorities in
daily life. Ethnic Bulgarians generally receive the
supervisory jobs, while the minorities are among
the frst to be laid off, and provocative references
to Tirks and Tirrkey in the media are still common.
201. The MFR has strongly criticised the
appointrnent of the Education Minister in the new
government as he is known to have been among
the theoreticians of the assimilation policy during
the communist era. This nomination and a number
of subsequent events have disturbed the Thrkish
minority.
202. Notwithstanding the abovementioned criti-
cism, Tirrkey is satisfied with the present level of
its relations with Bulgaria and sincerely wishes to
further improve them in every field, based on the
principles of friendship and good neighbourli-
ness. It views the Turkish minorities in the Bal-
kans as a bridge of friendship between the coun-
tries.
203. At the same time, Turkey feels that, for the
time being, the situation of the Turkish minority
in Bulgaria should be monitored closely.
(e) Russia
204. In May 1992, Russia and Turkey concluded
a treaty on bilateral relations which at that time
was said to herald the beginning of a new era in
relations between the two states. They had rea-
ched agreement on the conflict in Nagorno-Kara-
bakh, condemning the seizure of the Lachin corri-
dor by Karabakh Armenian forces, stressing that
the conflict could only be resolved by peaceful
means. It was also said that Russia acknowledged
Turkey's legitimate interest in the Transcaucasus
and Central Asia in view of its political, econo-
mic, cultural and political ties with both regions.
205. This exfraordinary honeymoon atmosphere
did not last very long, and indeed it seems that
there are too many incompatible interests in both
states in the region for their relations to remain
completely undisturbed. On the other hand, each
one has too much internal trouble even to think of
a major bilateral confrontation and it seems, the-
refore, that in the foreseeable future, they will
always try to keep their rivalries under control.
206. The main issues subject to rivalries are
conflicts in the Transcaucasus, in particular
Nagorno-Karabakh, and the transport and exploi-
tation of oil in the region. Both Turkey and Russia
participated in mediation efforts to find a solution
for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, but on the
other hand, Turkey has openly accused Russia of
supplying military aid to Armenia, while Russia
has said that Turkey was providing military aid to
Azerbaijan, warning it " to keep out of our Azer-
bujarl"o'.
207. Thrkey has not appreciated the ousting in
June 1993 of Azerbaijan's pro-Turkish President,
Abulfaz Elchibey, aware of tne widely believed
involvement of Russia in his succession by Geidar
Aliev.
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208. As mentioned in chapter VI of the present
report, oil in the region is a continuous bone of
contention. Both Russia and Turkey are striving
for the largest possible participation in the exploi-
tation in Azerbaijan's oil fields. For the transport
of oil and natural gas from the Caspian region to
the world market, both counmies have competing
proposals for pipelines across their own territory.
Turkey is using its Bosporus key to the Black Sea
to limit the shipping of oil from Russia's port of
Novorossiisk to the Mediterranean under Russian
protest and a solution is not yet in sight. It is
observed ttrat for its natural gas needs, Turkey, at
present, relies mainly on Russia.
209. On the other hand, it should be noted that in
March 1994, Turkey and Russia agreed to expand
their co-operation on combating terrorism, drug-
trafficking and organised crime. Later, on 20th
April 1995, a bilateral agreement was signed on
military+echnological and military-industrial co-
operation. Turkey has ordered Russian military
equipment such as helicopters and armoured per-
sonnel carriers needed in its fight against the
PKK, and also in its striving to find alternative
equipment sources since it discovered that allied
purveyors, such as Germany or Norway, may cut
off deliveries in protest against the violence of
operations.
210. When, as a result of military co-operation
agreements which both Georgia and Arrnenia had
no choice but to sign, Russian troops were again
deployed on the territory of these independent
republics, Turkey observed that Russia's armed
forces were back at its border as if nothing had
changed since the end of the cold war.
2ll. Russia's announcement on 26th April 1995
of the creation of the new 58th army to be
deployed in north Caucasus by June 1995 in vio-
lation of the CFE (conventional forces in Europe)
Treaty's flank limitations was not welcomed by
Turkey.
212. Following earlier declarations by Russian
Government officials on the need to revise the
CFE flank limitations, the Turkish Ministry for
Foreign Affairs declared on 19th April last that
the non-implementation of CFE Treaty obliga-
tions would have a negative influence on the sen-
sitive balance resulting from mutual sacrifices.
According to Turkey, it would also do harm to sta-
bility in Europe as envisaged by the treaty and
have negative consequences for the climate of
confidence and security which was the ultimate
objective of all the signatory states. Turkey final-
ly noted that the CFE review conference in 1996
could be an occasion to adapt the treaty to new
circumstances which have developed since the
signing of the treaty in 1990, but only provided
such adaptations do not affect its basic sffucture
and provisions.
213. In conclusion, it can be observed that Tur-
key will remain concerned over a possible resur-
gence of Russian imperialist policy in the Trans-
caucasus and Central Asian regions. Russia will
certainly remain suspicious over Turkey's efforts
to build close relations with the now independent
former Soviet republics in that region. Both coun-
tries seem to be aware, however, that they have
more to gain in co-operation than in trying to exa-
cerbate discrepancies, even more so as long as
their internal situation is subject to instability.
IV Turkey and the European Unian
2L4. Despite having undergone a troubled period
since the Turkish military intervention in Kurdis-
tan in March 1995, relations between Turkey and
the European Union have nevertheless gained
substance, particularly in the following areas.
215. Turkish nationals probably make up the lar-
gest foreign community in Europe, with 4 million
people and a significant percentage of the popula-
tion in several countries. This flow of immigrants
results in agreements being signed at various
times with different countries a. Although in
general it has slowed down since the years of the
oil crises and the increase in unemployment, the
number of Turkish nationals nevertheless conti-
nues to grow, in particular because they are joined
by family members. Experts anticipate a lasting
presence and progressive assimilation.
216. As for trade, the European Union has cap-
tured an increasing share, now the largest, oftrade
with Turkey. The Gulf crisis and the break-up of
the USSR have accentuated this underlying frend.
Trade between the European Union and Turkey
more than quadrupled between 1983 and l993,to
reach $20.2 billiono'.
217. Of all foreign investment in Turkey, 60Vo
comes from member countries of the European
Union6, ahead of the United States or Japano'.
218, The exceptional situation of Turkey, loca-
ted at the cross-roads of three major economic
units 
- 
the European Union, Central Asia and the
former Soviet Caucasus and the Middle East 
-
strengthens the sphere of influence of the Turkish
state and increases opportunities for trade. This
new factor nevertheless obliges Ankara to sort
out its strategic priorities in the area of external
economic relations. As one expert has said:
" It appears that Turkey continues to make the
customs union the main goal of its external eco-
Since l99l with Germany, 1965 with France.
Futuribles, November 1994.
M.6 billion.
l5%o ard 57o respectively.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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nomic policy, using regional stakes as a bargain-
ing counter vis i vis the interests of its European
partners 48.
(a) The customs union
(i) Bases of economic integration
219. The negotiations between Turkey and the
European Community for establishing a customs
union have not just been to determine economic
criteria in conformity with the principles set out in
the Treaty of Rome, the treaty on the single mar-
ket or for the economic and monetary union. Tur-
key's European r6le also has a political dimension
through the country's now long-standing r6le as
an intermediary.
220. ln 1963 4e, the EEC and Turkey in fact
signed an association agreement (the Ankara
Agreement), which by and large originated from
the wish of members of the EEC to keep Tirrkey
in the sphere of influence of Western Europe. Thi's
agreement was completed in 197050 by the signing
in Brussels of an additional protocol opening the
prospect of full accession. From the outset the
intention was to achieve the customs union within
32 years. After a long period of stagnation due to
procrastination by the Tlvelve and bilateral ten-
sion with Greece over the Cyprus question, an
official application for accession to the EC was
lodged in 1987 by Turgut Ozal, then head of
government, but the EC did not consider it timely
at that moment. Although it had contributed to
raising the stakes for Turkey's participation in a
united Europe, the fall of the USSR has in no way
lessened the geopolitical interest of this collabor-
ation.
221. The June 1992 Cowcil of Europe summit
meeting in Lisbon and the decision announced in
1993 by the Council of the EC-Turkey Associa-
tion to reactivate the Ankara Agreement confirm
the re-evaluation of Turkey's strategic r6le in the
framework of the new European structure.
( ii ) Re c ent dev e lopme nt s
222. On 6th February 1995, the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the fifteen European Union
countries concluded an agreement of principle,
smoothing the way towards a customs union with
Turkey and accession negotiations with Cyprus. It
was thought that this might lead to sftengthening
relations between Europe and Turkey, which the
European Union regards as having a major geos-
trategic r6le and unblocking the Cyprus dispute
which had been bogged down for twenty yffirs.
223. In order to induce Greece to give up its
long-standing veto against a customs union with
Turkey, the fifteen agreed to link the Turkish cus-
toms union issue with negotiations on the acces-
qloq of the Republic of Cyprus to the European
Union. Having supported this in principle, the
Greek Government nevertheless rejecled the
" package ". As 'o certain Greek demands were
felt to be reasonable while others were not "sr, a
revised draft compromise was examined on
28th February 1995, which provides, on the basis
of work done by the permanent representatives
and bilateral talks between the GreekGovernment
and the French presidency ofthe Council, for:
- 
the opening of negotiations with Cyprus
over its accession, to start six months after
ttre end of the intergovernmenAl conference
on the revision of the Maasficht Treaty;
- 
a structured dialogue with Cyprus prior
to the opening of negotiations;
- 
financial assistance to Turkey and the
establishment of a customs union bet-
ween the European Union and Ttrkey by
lstJanuary 1996.
?-?4. As regards textiles, Greece is requesting
financial compensation worth 400 million ecus to
enable it to cope with the repercussions of the
future opening up the community market to Tur-
kish textiles. Several member states have rejected
Greece's demand, arguing that the position of
their own textile industries is precarious. The
solution might lie in a declaration of the European
Commission containing a commitment to exami-
ne, if necessary, the situation that will result from
the opening of the market to Turkish textiles.
225. Finatly, on 6th March 1995, the Europeans
signed an agreement on a customs union with
Ankara, widely acclaimed in Turkey, except in
hard-line anti-westem Islamic circles, and for which
the Prime Minister, Mrs. Ciller, received the credit.
226. Before it can be put into practice, this agree-
ment must, however, be ratified in autumn 1995by
ttre European Parliament, which has made its sup
port conditional upon substantial progress on
human rights and democratisation in Tlrkey.
( iii ) Practical arrangements
227. The following must be achieved in practice
between now and the end of 1995:
- 
free movement of goods within the entire
area covered by Turkey and the enlarged
European Union, which implies the
removal of customs duties and other
quantitative restrictions;
5 1. Address by the Chairman of the Council, Alain Jupp6, to
a committee of the European Parliament, cf. Europe,
No. 6429, 27th and 28th February 1995.
48. Philippe B6raud, Cahiers de I'Orient, No.30,2nd quarter
1993.
49. On l2th September.
50. On 23rd November.
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- 
harmonisation of customs tariffs with the
common external tariff and preferential
or defensive policies towards third coun-
tries;
- 
sfiengthening of co-operation in various
fields (energy, protection ofthe environ-
ment, the fight against drugs, banking
sectors, etc.);
- 
convergence of legislation on frade and
in areas such as competition, intellectual
and industrial property, public tenders,
technical regulations, anti-dumping rules
and nade marks.
228. Turkey is preparing for this undertaking; in
fact each year it has amended its customs duties
with the European Unions2.
(iv) Wider stakes
229. The stakes are in fact far wider, if the then
European Commissioner, Mrs. Scrivener, speak-
ing in September 1993, is to be believed when she
said that the customs union was not a means of
delaying the goal of Turkey's eventual accession
to the Community; on the conrary it gave Turkey
a greater share now in the future of the Communi-
ty than was possible by association. The customs
union therefore seems to be a decisive step in
confirming Turkey's place alongside the Euro-
pean Union and facilitating subsequent develop-
ments.
230. Is it possible to regard the process entered
into with the customs union as a step towards
accession? According to the theory of economic
integration, customs union is in fact the second stage
of integration, following on from the initial one of
establishing a free trade area. This prospective
accession nevertheless raises a number of ques-
tions: is the Turkish economy in a position to
handle the consfraints of a customs union bringing
together a majority of countries whose level of
industrialisation is very high?
231. What difficulties will arise from the next
stage, the common market, which necessitates
free movement of people and capital? In all pro-
bability it will be the pace of development of the
Turkish economy, which, by narrowing the gap
between Turkey and the members of the European
Union and thus weakening the pressure of emi-
gration and at the same time atffacting foreign
investment, will determine the feasibility of
achieving a corrmon market. What, in short, will
be Tlrrkey's place in new European developments
that envisage simultaneous deepening and enlar-
gement?
52. Irl1994 it had achieved close to 807o ofthe target fixed
by the European Union.
232. The pottical stakes attaching to economic
integration seem in some ways of greater signifi-
cance now than during the cold war. The Euro-
pean Union is banking on Turkey's conftibution
to stabilising the disturbed regional equilibrium:
in the Middle East, where Turkey over the years
has maintained traditional ties of proximity with
the Arab countries, developments are of interest
to the economies of European Union members;
in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, where the
Turkish state often provides a point ofreference,
or has even a pivotal r6le in monitoring the course
of the economic restructuring process in the newly
independent republics; and finally in the Balkans
where Turkey could provide a useful complement
to the prevailing views in the European Union.
233. In short, economic and financial negotia-
tions between Turkey and the European Union
have a marked geopolitical dimension. " Both the
Turkish and European sides are faced with a new
environment and fundamental challenges for the
future, which cannot in any sense be dealt with
adequately simply by retaining the old strategic
optionssx " Turkey's r6le would then appear to be
that of a pole of stability amidst an environment
of uncertainty and a political reference point
capable of counteracting fundamentalist extre-
IruSIn.
234. Furthermore, by opening up prospects for
the accession of Cyprus, the European Union has
made a serious and positive effort in providing an
impetus that could be decisive for a subsequent
political settlement of the Cypriot question under
United Nations sponsorship.
V. Turkey andWBU
235. Although Turkey has made it clear that its
objective is to become a fulI member of WEU, it
is conscious of the fact that, as a consequence of
decisions taken at the Maastricht summit meeting
of December 1991, it can only be an associate
member for the time being. In implementation of
the document on associate membership of WEU
of 20th November 1992, and the declaration
following on from the document on associate
membership which was issued after the WEU
Council's ministerial meeting at Kirchberg,
Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994, Tirrkey is partici-
pating fully in WEU activities.
236. Turkey has transmitted a full list of Turkish
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) to the WEU
Planning Cell with the understanding that the
actual deployment and employment of these
forces will be subject to authorisation by the
53. Georges Delcoigne, CERIS (Centre for Studies in Inter-
national and Strategic Relations), Free University of Brussels.
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Turkish Grand National Assembly under constitu-
tional stipulations.
237 . At present, there are in particular two issues
where Turkey is trying to improve its position
within the WEU framework: one is linked with
the implementation of the CJTF concept, the other
with the rights of the Turkish associate members
of the WEU Assembly.
(a) Tturkey, CJTF arul WEU
238. Turkey fully supports the combined joint
task force (CJ"ID concept as proposed at the NAf,O
summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994.
239. It has observed, however, that employment
of CJTFs in the framework of WEU could cause
problems. According to Article 3 of the document
on associate membership of WEU of 20th
November 1992, Turkey 
- 
as an associate mem-
ber 
- 
can participate fully in activities mentioned
in that article. This includes participation in the
implementation of decisions taken by WEU mem-
ber states and participation, on the same basis as
full members, in WEU military operations to
which they commit forces. Such participation is
subject to the provision that a majority of the
member states, or half of the member states
including the presidency, may decide otherwise.
240. Application of the abovementioned provi-
sion of Article 3 could lead to the exclusion of
Turkey from a military operation by WEU in
which it makes use of CJTFs, including NATO
assets, of which Turkey participates as a full
member of NATO.
241. In order to prevent the occurrence of such
anomalous situations, Turkey refers to Article 4 of
the document on associate membership, which is
as follows:
" The Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of
Norway and the Republic of Turkey will
have the same rights and responsibilities as
the full members for functions transferred
to WEU from other fora and institutions to
which they already belong. "
242. Although Turkey recognises that this
article refers to functions and not to operations, it
is proposing that in the case of operations in
which NATO's CJTFs are being used by WEU,
associate members would have the same rights
and responsibilities as the full members of WEU
in application of the spirit of Article 4 of the docu-
ment on associate membership.
(b) The status of associde mmben of the WEU Assembly
243. When Turkey signed the document on
associate membership, a satisfactory status was to
be created for the representatives of associate
member countries of WEU in the Assembly. The
internal discussion started with a report on the
enlargement of WEU by Mr.Ward, United King-
dom, on behalf of the Political Committee. After
the adoption by the Assembly, in June 1993, of
Recommendation 536 and Order 85, the Assem-
bly's Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi
leges was asked to prepare proposals on the status
of representatives of associate members.
24. Without referring to the different proposals
since made, it is noted here that the basic idea has
always been that, in accordance with the decisions
taken by the WEU Council, the Assembly could
not grant associate members a status completely
equal to the status of full members. Turkey, how-
ever, has insisted that its representatives in the
Assembly should have full voting rights.
Conscious of the prevailing opinion in the Assem-
bly, Turkey has argued that if its representatives
cannot be granted full voting rights, they should
be granted the right to vote on all issues except
those mentioned in Rule 36(a) of the Assembly's
Rules of Procedure. Turkey takes the view that
this second-best solution would come closest to
Turkey's position in the WEU Council, where it
cannot block the consensus.
245. On this mafter, reference is made here to a
report prepared by Lord Finsberg on behalf the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
for the June 1995 session of the Assembly.
VI. Turkey's rdle in water and energy supply
(a) Waer supply in the reginn
246. With its mountainous regions and high
plains in the east of the country where both the
Euphrates and the Tigris have their origins, Turkey
occupies a strategic position in the water supply
of the region, in particular of Syria and Iraq.
247. Over9SVo ofthe Euphrates flow and457o
of the flow of the Tigris originate in Turkey and
together both rivers account for one third of Tur-
key's surface water supply.
248. In order to stimulate the agricultural and
industrial development of the underdeveloped
eastern part of the country, Ttrrkey is now imple-
menting the south-east Anatolia Project (GAP).
With a total investrnent estimated at between $32
billion and $40 billion, it consists of thirteen main
projects: six in the Tigris and seven in the
Euphmtes. A total number of twenty-one dams
and nineteen hydroelectric power generating sta-
tions should provide irrigation and electricity for a
vast region. The largest barrage, named after
Kemal Atatiirk, was put into service in 1992. It is
expected that the Euphrates, with the GAP com-
pleted and in full service, will provide 307o less
water in Syria and 25Vo less in Iraq.
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249. In 1987, a protocol was signed between
Turkey and Syria, according to which Turkey
guarantees that the waterflow of the Euphrates at
the border between the two countries will not be
less than an average of 500 cubic metres per
second.
250. The GAP will inevitably compete with
continuing Syrian and Iraqi plans to increase their
irrigated agricultural areas. On the other hand,
Syrian irigation schemes using the Asi (Orontes)
river have virtually hdted the flow of the river
into Turkey's Hatay province, an area which is
claimed by Syria. 90Vo of the average annual
discharge of the Asi is used by Syria.
251. It should be noted here that the first terrorist
activities of the PKK coincided with the start of
building the Atatiirk dam. It is generally assumed
in Turkey that Syria provides active support to the
PKK in order to exert pressure on Turkey in the
issue of water supply.
252. Border security and Kurdish nationalism
preoccupy the states in the region to a greater
extent than concern over the consequences of
Turkey's GAP and it can be noted that the states in
the Tigris-Euphrates basin have directed their
energies into decrying the unreasonable actions of
their neighbours rather than into solving the
problem of domestic water distribution.
253. Tirrkey's water projects are largely motiva-
ted by a quest for cheaper, domestically-produced
energy. The Euphrates and the Tigris account for
4OVo of Turkey's hydroelectric energy potential
and they are expected to supply 25Vo of elecricity
in Turkey if the GAP project is fully imple-
mented.
254. The GAP's objective is to develop the rela-
tively impoverished region of south-east Anatolia
for agriculture and agro-industrial production and
to raise the standard of living of the Kurdish
population in the area. While the project was
conceived as the economic answer to Kurdish
demands for self-determination, Syria and Iraq
have to some extent perceived it as a means of
international pottical leverage.
255. Syria and Iraq are also concerned about
deterioration in water quality since some irriga-
tion water will flow back into the rivers contai-
ning higher levels of pesticides, fertilisers and
chlorides.
256. On the other hand, it should be noted that
the implementation of the GAP faces a number of
constraints. It is financed almost entirely from
Turkish sources which has contributed to the
counbry's high inflation rate. Accompanying pro-
jects to improve infrastructure and education do
not keep pace with the building of dams. Land-
ownership is still distributed very unequally and
there is a lack of training and credit facilities for
farmers which prevents many from taking advan-
tage of the new opportunities.
257. Syria sees the expansion of irigation and
domestic food production within the F,uphrates
region as an economic priority. It seems, however,
that a realistic assessment of Syria's likely water
requirements from the Euphrates does not exceed
the water supply of a yearly average of 500 cubic
metres per second, agreed upon with Turkey in
1987. In April 1990, a Syrian-Iraqi agreement was
concluded according to which Syria would receive
42Vo and haq 58Vo of annual Euphrates water
flows entering Syria at its border with Turkey.
258. Iraq fears that GAP and hydraulic projects
in Syria will reduce Euphrates flows by two-thirds
to 11 cubic kilometres per year and even as low as
7 cubic kilometres per year, which could irrigate
only 36.8Vo of Iraqi lands watered in 1990.
259. In its relations with Syria, Turkey has been
reluctant to make concessions on water issues,
feeling that water is a useful tool in negotiations
on Syria's support for opponents of Turkish
government policy, in particular the PKK, and on
Syrian irredentist claims to the province of Hatay,
part of the former French mandate of Syria which
was ceded to Turkey in 1939.
260. According to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
Turkey is obliged to consult Iraq before under-
taking any hydraulic works and the Ankara Tleaty
of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, signed
by Turkey and Iraq in 1946, stipulated that Iraq
was to be consulted before Turkey carried out any
development projects on the Tigns or Euphrates.
261. When Turkey unilaterally took its decision
to go ahead with the GAR both Syria and Iraq
considered this to be an aggtessive and insensitive
action. Later, in 1982, Turkey and Iraq established
a Joint Technical Comminee, which Syria joined
in 1983, and which has since met at regular inter-
vals for general project discussions and data
exchange. Problems of competing claims fromthe
different parties have, however, not been solved
and the existing bilateral agreements are limited
rn scope.
262. While Syria and Iraq are calling for a unila-
teral agreement, Turkey continues to argue that its
1987 agreement with Syria is adequate for down-
stream requirements and that Syria and Iraq should
use their water supplies more efficiently. Turkey
considers the Tigris and Euphrates as sovereign
resources which it may exploit as it sees fit. An
agreement to share the water from the Euphrates
would, in Turkey's opinion, impose Iraqi and
Syrian sovereignty on a Turkish asset. In July
l992,whenthe Attatiirkdam was put into service,
the Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel, said that
" Tirkey and haq have no more righs over Ttrkish
water than Turkey over their oil. " On the other
hand, Turkey is in favour of bilateral joint ven-
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tures in water and energy development and co-
operation in practical matters such as data mana-
gement and water-saving studies.
263. Finally, the very ambitious Ozal pipeline
for peace project starting with the Ceyhan and
Seyhen rivers for irrigating the Adana region will
never be carried into effect. Indeed this project
involved building two canal systems, one through
Syria and the other towards kaq and the Gulf.
264. At present it is very unlikely that issues
connected with the waters of the Tigns and the
Euphrates will escalate into a conflict, but Turkey
will certainly continue to use water as a negotiat-
ing tool as long as the security of its borders and
the Kurdish question have not been solved in a
satisfactory manner.
(b) Energy sources in the Caspian region
265. The Eurasian region may be expected to
become an important source for the energy needs,
in particular oil and gas, of Europe and other
western countries. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the establishment of independent
states in that region has created a new situation
which as yet is rather unsettled, if not unstable.
Many power struggles are still taking place
within and, as is the case in Armenia and Azer-
baijan, even between states. At the same time,
foreign, mostly western, oil companies are trying
to get a stable foothold in the region while, in par-
ticular, Russia, Turkey and Iran are involved in a
competition for influence.
266. Most of the known oil and gas reserves of
the former Soviet Union are located in Russia. Of
the recent estimates of 162 billion barrels of pro-
ven, probable and possible oil reserves on the ter-
ritory of the former Soviet Union, Russia has 137
billion, Kazakhstan 15 billion, Azerbaijan 4 bil-
lion, Turkmenistan 3.2 billion and the remaining
CIS countries 2.8 billion.
267. It is thought, however, that the region
around the Caspian Sea, including the Caucasus
and the Central Asian republics, where many
reserves have not yet been identified nor tested,
could develop into an oil and natural gas produ-
cing region which could rival some of the nations
around the Persian Gulf. Experts estimate, for
example, that Kazakhstan may possess the world's
third largest concentration of oil after the Persian
Gulf and Siberia. Western oil companies, provi-
ding capital and modern technology are now
moving towards arrangements which will permit
the joint development of these reseryes. The ques-
tion of how to get the oil and gas from the Caspian
region to the world market still awaits a satisfac-
tory solution. Russia, Turkey and kan are each
particularly interested in having pipelines run
through their territory.
268. At present, the European Union has to meet
nearly half of its energy requirements with
imports. According to projections made by the
International Energy Agency (EA), it is most
probable that, in the future, the European Union
will become even more dependent on imports.
Obviously, it is important to make sure that the
sources for energy imports will be sufficiently
diversified since many external production
regions are prone to political instability.
269. It is estimated for instance, that the Euro-
pean Union's present natural gas demand of 220
billion meffes3 per year could increase to 300 or
even 450 billion metres3 in the year 2010, with
indigenous natural gas production, at present
around 135 bcm per year, most probably dimini-
shing to 120 bcm by the year 2010. Presently,
more than 20c/o of Ewope's continental gas needs
are imported from the former Soviet Union's ter-
ritory via pipelines across Ukraine and the Czech
and Slovak republics, but there have been tempo-
rary reductions in supply caused by disputes in
these countries over payment and transit tariffs.
270. In the first place, because ofits geographi-
cal position, Turkey is most probably destined to
play an important r6le in the energy trade between
suppliers in the Caspian region and their Western
European customers and this position will have a
profound influence on Turkey's relations with the
European Union.
271. Different solutions have been proposed for
transporting oil from the Caspian region to the
West. Russia obviously prefers pipelines to go to
its Black Sea port of Novorossiysk from where
tankers could transport the oil through the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean to international oil
markets. Turkey is not in favour of this solution
because of the limited safety regulations for oil
tankers sailing through the Bosporus.
272. Turkmenistan, which is an important
exporter of natural gas, is looking for an alter-
native to the present gas pipeline through Russian
territory, not the least because of its frequent
disputes with Russia over ftansport charges.
273. In Azerbaijan, the output of the current pro-
ducing oil fields is in natural decline, but with the
inflow of western technology and capital, there
are good prospects for the exploitation of new
fields. A barrier to further development of the oil
fields in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is the
absence of a good pipeline system to transport the
oil out of the area.
274. At present, there are three important
exploitation deals in the region, the viability of
which is wholly or largely dependent on pipeline
routes out of the region: a S20 billion Chevron
project at the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan; a
$7.4 billion project of ten foreign oil companies
and the Azerbaijan Government, ratified by the
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Azeri Parliament on 15th November 1994, to
exploit reserves off Baku and a combined British
Gas-Agip deal to develop the Kazakhaganah gas
field in Kazakhstan.
275. The Russian Energy Minister, Yuri Shafra-
nik, has stated publicly that Russia must have a
major stake in all energy exploitation projects in
that region. Russia's pressure has already resulted
in its participation in the Azeri oil deal and in the
Kazakhaganah gas deal. Moreover, Russian pres-
sure has been able to block any pipeline deal so
far.
276. The composition of the international
consortium for the exploitation of the Azeri oil
freld near Baku is a clear example of the many dif-
ferent interests involved and pressures exerted. It
started as a deal between the Azeri state oil com-
pany Socar and Anglo-Saxon oil companies, the
Norwegian Statoil company and a l.75%o share of
Turkey's TPAO. Then Russia, after having put
pressure on Azerbaijan, obtained a l07o stake for
its Lukoil company. When Iran managed to obtain
a 5Vo stake offered by Azerbaijan, Turkey felt
obliged to raise its own share. In March 1995, it
was satisfied when Azerbujan gave it 5Vo exta,
bringing Turkish participation to a total of 6.75Vo.
Meanwhile, the United States opposed the 5Vo
offer to Iran.
277. The different pipeline schemes from Eur-
asian exploitation fields to western markets now
under consideration 
- 
each requiring multi-billion
dollar f,rnancing 
- 
are the following:
- 
Upgrading the existing pipeline which
carries Russian and some Chewon oil to
Novorossiysk, Russia's main oil export-
ing port on the Black Sea. This line could
carry oil from both Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan.
Turkey is severely opposed to this idea
since it would strongly increase tanker
traffic through the Bosporus which,
according to Ti:rkey, has already reached
its maximum capacity. Both for environ-
mental and safety reasons, Turkey has
introduced new regulations on the pas-
sage through the Bosporus which beca-
me operational in July 1994, stipulating
that tankers with harmful chemical
loads, nuclear-powered vessels or ships
with nuclear-related material need to
request permission to pass through
from the Turkish Ministry of the Envi-
ronment.
- 
Transporting Eurasian oil and gas through
pipelines to Novorossiyslq then by tanker
to Samsun or another port on T[rkey's
Black Sea coast and from ttrere via pipe-
Iine to Iskenderun on the Mediterranean.
Russia has proposed a variant to tranship
oil from Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian
Black Sea port of Burgas and from there
by pipeline to the Greek Aegean port of
Alexandroupolis.
- 
A line from Baku via Georgia to its
Black Sea port of Batumi, then by ship to
Burgas and again to Alexandroupolis.
The flaw here is that under present cir-
cumstances the Georgian Government is
not able to guarantee the security of the
pipeline on its territory.
- 
A project for a pipeline from Azerbarian
through Iran and Nakhichevan to the port
of Ceyhan on the southern coast of Tur-
key. This pipeline would be large enough
later to accommodate exports from
Kazakhstan.
One problem of this proposal is that it
would run through a region in Turkey
where Kurdish terrorism is still active. It
is also noted that American participants
in the pipeline project would not be able
to ship oil through Iran or to its own
stakes in Iranian pipelines. Hence the
concerted efforts to put an end to the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh and to bring
about the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from occupied Azeri territory. This could
open the way for the pipeline to go
through Armenian territory.
- 
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Russia, kan and
Kazakhstan have set up an operating
company, the Turkmenistan transconti-
nental pipeline company which is trying
to raise finance for a $6 billion and 2 500
kilometre pipeline through Iranian and
Turkish territory to carry natural gas
from Turkmenistan to EuropeY.
- 
Beginning January 1995, Russia and
Kazakhstan announced a plan with
Oman participating, to build a new pipe-
line from the Caspian sea to Russia's
Black Sea coast. This clear Russian
success also indicated that Kazakhstan
realised that without significant Russian
participation it would not easily manage
to exploit its large oil and gas reserves5'.
278. The former Soviet Union had constructed
an impressive network of oil and natural gas pipe-
lines, but at present an important part of this net-
work is in need of repair, rehabilitation or even
replacement. Accidents along these pipelines are
frequent, there is no corrosion protection, and
energy waste at compressors is a serious problem.
Inevitably, the construction of new oil and gas
54. Financial Times, l8thJanuary 1995.
55. Financial Times, 24th January 1995.
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pipelines from the Eurasian fields to the western
markets seems to be a priority issue.
279. For the time-being, the use of the Russian
network may be the only viable way as long as the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and
the conflict in former Yugoslavia have not been
solved. On the other hand, for environmental and
safety reasons, Turkey, as mentioned above, is
strongly opposed to increased tanker traffic
through the already congested Bosporus.
280. Russia has proposed a multinational co-
ordinating committee to decide on the exploita-
tion of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian-Sea56.
At the initiative of Russia, representatlves of all
the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea met on
12th October 1994 in an effort to try to hammer
out their differences over claims to the region's
natural resources.
28L. Russia has stressed the unacceptability of
unilateral action by any one govemment border-
ing the sea and it is strongly supported in this view
by Iran. In a complete volte-face, Russia has also
expressed its concern for ecological damage to the
Caspian Sea as compared to the communist era,
when the Soviet Union exploited the Caspian
f,relds near Baku without any regard for ecological
consequences.
VII. A Tturkish initiative:
The Black Sea economic co-operatian zone
(a) H isto rbal p erc p e ctiv e
282. The move towards the regional integration
of countries surrounding the Black Sea was initiated
by Turkey in 1990. The project began to mareria-
lise after the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania
expressed their interest in economic co-operation
in the Black Sea region in the wake of eConomic
transformation. The countries interested started
negotiations on technical matters, such as poten-
tial fields of co-operation, tariff reduction and
freedom of movement. They held four meetings
between December 1990 and July 1991 and even-
tually compiled a document outlining the most
important contours of the planned multilateral
agreement. The disintegration of the Soviet Union
increased the number of participating states to
nine and, on 25th June 1992, Albania, Armenia,
Azerbujan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (a total of
11 countries) signed the declaration of Black Sea
economic co-operation (BSEC) committing
themselves to new multilateral co-operation based
on the principles of market economy.
283. This extensive and ambitious progftlrnme
of economic co-operation covered trade, indus-
trial co-operation, science and technologS envi-
ronment, transportation, communication and
information technologies, exchange of economic
and commercial data, standardisation, energy,
mining, tourism, agriculture and agro-industriEi,
veterinary and sanitary protection, health care and
pharmaceutics. The main purpose of the BSEC
was to improve political stability and economic
wglfare in the region through economic co-oper-
ation- It was regarded as a step towards integra-
tion into the world economy. Articles V andVII
of the declaration explicitly state that BSEC is not
an alternative to existing integration projects but
a complementary process to achieve a higher
degree of integration into the western economy.
284. Economic co-operation is being promoted
gradually given the wide range of economic pro-
blems of the member counffies which are in tran-
sition to market economies. Any state which reco-
gnises the provisions of the declaration can
become a member of BSEC or can be partially
involved in certain projects. The assumptioir
behind this initiative is that the private sector must
be the driving force for co-operation among the
member states. The r6le of governments is to pro-
vide the necessary legal, economic, commertial
and fiscal framework to promote the free trade of
ggoqs and services in the region by removing any
kind of barrier to trade; to facilitate the free move-
ment of (business) people; to provide an appro-
priate environment for the free flow of capital by
taking precautions to prevent double taxati,on. Th-e
governments must also take an active r61e in the
implementation of joint projects for the develop-
ment of infrastructure in the region and the
protection of the environment (especially the
preservation of the Black Sea).
285. Meanwhile, an institutional and financial
framework has been created, including a BSEC
permanent international secretariat, a BSEC co-
ordination centre for the exchange of statistical
data and economic information and a Black Sea
trade and development bank. ln December 1992,
the business communities of the participating
states established a BSEC Council which has been
granted observer status in the BSEC. The objecti-
ve of the Council is to develop proposals, pro-
grarnmes and projects in all the different fields of
co-operation. In February 1993, the parliamentary
as..sep61, of the BSEC was established which may
stimulate national parliaments to pass legislation
needed for the implementation of BSEC legis-
lation.
(b) Potential gains from. economic co-operation
( i ) Ec onomic adv anta g e s
286. The BSEC zone consists of countries com-
plementing each other. Except for Greece and
Turkey, the other members had close trade rela-56. Financial Times, 27th September 1994.
33
DOCIJMENT 1465
tions with each other in the past. However, this
does not mean that they were natural trading part-
ners: under communist rule, these countries had
protected industries and all trade was conducted
through state orders. Most of these industries are
not competitive by international standards and a
lot of the trade in the region is diverted rade. Co-
operation as envisaged in the declaration would
establish new trade patterns and overcome this
trade diversion.
287. The present volume of trade in the region
can be increased considerably. Let us focus on the
case of Tirkey, which in the past had very little
trade with the former Soviet Union (FSU) and
other former communist countries. Of all its rade
with FSU republics, the largest trade volume is
with Russia and that only accounts for 3Vo of Tur-
key's total exports in 1992 and 4.5Vo of its
imports. Turkey's trade with these republics
accounts for only circa 77o of its total trade in
1992. At present, the restrictive trade r6gime of
the FSU could be one reason for such a low trade
level. The current economic situation in these
countries also places constraints on trade in
convertible currency. It will take some time for
ffade in the region to be revitalised since a solu-
tion to the region's financial problems is an in-
escapable prerequisite to economic co-operation.
There is as yet no legal infrasffucture to facilitate
the transfer of money and capital in the region.
This is the reason why the BSEC members gave
priority to the establishment of a Black Sea trade
and development bank (BSTDB).
288. The BSTDB is designed to finance both
intra-regional and external trade and to facilitate
the fransfer of capital into the region. The share of
capial of each country was set at 16.5%o for Greece,
Russia and Turkey, 13.5Vo for Bulgaria,
Romania and Ukraine, and 2Vo for Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova.
Countries are allowed to increase their capital
share as they complete their economic transition.
The paid-in capital of the bankbeing initially low,
it was decided that it would finance trade rather
than investments. In this manner, the bank could
play a significant r6le in strengthening rade in the
region which is blocked because of a convertible
currency shortage. The bank can invest in short-
and long-term projects in the region and can also
function as a guarantor. This is a key factor consi-
dering that the region is seen as a high-risk area by
investors.
289. So far, BSEC countries have been exchang-
ing information in various fields of co-operation.
With the support of Turkey's State Institute of
Statistics in Ankara, participating states have
created the BSEC co-ordination centre for the
exchange of statistical data and economic infor-
mation. This initial information on BSEC mem-
bers is required in order to achieve harmonisation
of foreign trade and to prepare the conditions for
the adoption of free trade agreements. Co-oper-
ation in infrastructure building has begun with a
plan to create a " ring " corridor along the Black
Sea coast, as well as a radial network and a pro-
gmrnme for the modernisation and construction of
new sea ports and the development of port struc-
tures. In telecommunications, there are two pro-
grammes of fibre-optic submarine cable systems,
one connecting Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and
Turkey, and the other connecting Russia, T\rrkey,
Ukraine and Italy due to be completed in 1995.
290. After seven years of Uruguay rounds,
regional integration might seem to lose its impor-
tance as a provider of free trade. However, the
establishment of a free trade area in the BSEC still
seems to be a distant prospect. First, the member-
ship of Greece in the European Union and the fact
that Turkey might enter the European Union cus-
toms union in 1995 limit their trade r6gimes with
third countries. One possibility would be to adopt
European Union standards in trade, given the fact
that most BSEC members wish eventually to join
the European Union. On the other hand, apart
from Greece, which has been a member since
1981, none of these countries will become a mem-
ber of the European Union in the near future. Uni-
Iateral liberalisation of ftade and multilateral co-
operation are thus the only options for now. Some
economists argue that unilateral trade liberalisa-
tion may dominate any free trade area; however,
regional integration may contribute to the welfare
of the region through co-operation in fields such
as education, infrastructure, research and deve-
lopment, and environment. The BSEC could pro-
vide a favourable ground to undertake such pro-
jects in the region, a far more important r6le for
now than the provision of free trade.
(ii) Political advantages and problems
291. Although the BSEC has an economic orien-
tation, there is also a sfrong political aspect: the
safeguarding of peace and stability in the region.
The political aims can be summarised as follows:(i) to take advantage of the new internationaljuncture created by European d6tente; (ii) to
sffengthen political undglstanding and co-opera-
tion after building the necessary economic infra-
structure; and (iii) to facilitate the active partici-
pation of member countries in the European
integration process through regional co-operation.
The political aspects of co-operation are also stated
by the members in the Bosporus statement issued
at the close of the Istanbul meeting in 1992.T\ey
noted that their partnership was inspired by the
values of democracy, rule of law and respect for
human rights. They also realistically acknowled-
ged the existence of serious conflicts and the dan-
ger of future new tensions and they emphasised
the need for the peaceful settlement of all disputes
in accordance with the principles set out in the
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OSCE documents ro which they all subscribed.
Through intensive co-operation and the develop-
ment of good-neighbourly relations, it is hoped
that it will promote peace and friendship. The
Bulgarian, Georgian, Romanian, Russian and
Tiukish sides are also considering close co-oper-
ation at diplomatic level. However, it is doubtful
whether conflicting parties such as Armenia and
Azerbaijan will agree to this. The prerequisite for
close co-operation at a political level is the settle-
ment of existing conflicts between member states.
292. The BSEC covers an area larger than the
territory of the EU and has a total population of
324 mtllion About half of this number lives in
Russia (Turkey has 56.6 million and Ukraine 52.5
million inhabitants). The BSEC is characterised
by national and religious diversity. There are
several types of conflict in the region:
- 
conEoversies over sovereignty inside the
FSU;
- 
territorial disputes between member
states of the BSEC;
- 
nationality conflicts within individual
countries as a result of ethnic interming-
ling of titular nations and minorities.
293. There are enmities between some states
which have their origins in the past such as the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has traditionally
sftained relations with Turkey. There is a Turkish-
Greek conflict over the use of the Aegean Sea and
over Cyprus and the relationship between Bulga-
ria and Greece is strained. All these disputes and
conflicts, not to mention others, could impede co-
operation. Also, perception of the initiative varies
with each member. Some feel that Tlrrkey might
be using the BSEC to expand economically in the
region, others claim that Russia has a historical
interest in the Black Sea area and could use the
initiative to secure its presence there and to keep
its hegemony over former Soviet states. Tirkeyt
and Russia's interests might clash in the area.
Obstacles are numerous and extremely diffrcult to
overcome. It might take a very long time for
members to begin to grasp the advantages of this
important initiative.
Pmr TWo: Gnmco
I. Greece and the Balkans
294. With the armed conflict in former Yugosla-
via continuing despite cease-fre agreements and
peace proposals, Greece considers the present
unstable situation as threatening to its own secur-
ity. Security experts have suggested different
nightmare scenarios, each of which would affect
Greece.
295. One possibility is the outbreak of ethnic
violence in Kosovo, which could spill over to the
Albanian-populated Tetovo region in FYROM.
Serbian intervention in Kosovo could extend to
the FYROM's territory. Even if there would not
be a spill-over of armed operations into the
FYROM, armed intervention in Kosovo would
trigger massive migration of ethnic Albanians in a
southern direction, causing ethnic Greeks in Alba-
nia to flee to Greece.
296. An armed conflict between Albania and
Serbia, as a consequence of oppression of Alba-
nians in Kosovo, would not only result in massive
refugee migration but could also lead to a redefi-
nition of borders and start a very undesirable pro-
cess of further instability in the region.
297 . The possible involvement of Turkish troops
in operations to protect or support the Muslim
population in Bosnia or other regions in the Bal-
kans could lead Greece to reconsider its policy of
non-involvement in the Balkan conflict, in parti-
cular, if its border areas would be threatened or
violated.
298. Although escalations of the existing conflict
in the Balkans cannot be ruled out, it seems that
some of the abovementioned scenarios, in particu-
lar the intervention of Tirrkish troops in order to
protect Muslim populations in the region, are far-
fetched.
299. On the other hand, it should be recognised
that the economic malaise, social tension and
political fragility in the ex-communist states
neighbouring Greece could easily lead to mass
migration southward. The desperate economic
situation has already caused such migration
movements at an earlier stage with up to 400 000
Albanians tying to integrate into the Greek society
and economy, resulting in serious social and eco-
nomic problems for Greece itself.
300. Except for its relations with the FYROM,
Greece's policy in the Balkans is at present less
outspoken than in the early st4ges of the war in
former Yugoslavia and, in general, Greece
appears to have chosen a position which is more
or less in line with the attitude taken by rhe other
member states of WEU.
(a) Albania
301. The main causes of tension between Greece
and Albania, in particular since 1991 when the lat-
ter began to open up its frontiers, have been the
large numbers of illegal immigrant workers
moving from Albania to Greece and respect for
the human rights of the Greek and orthodox mino-
rity living in Albania.
302. Since 1991, there have been up to some
400 000 illegal Albanian immigrants in Greece
whose earnings represent a substantial contribu-
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tion to the economy of Albania. At regular inter-
vals, Greece has organised the expulsion of large
numbers of them back to Albania. One round of
expulsions took place in the summer of 1993 and
another one in August and September 1994, aftet
the Greek Minister of Public Order announced a
package of new measures to stem the tide of ille-
gal immigrants from Albania. In justifying_this
policy, Greece invoked the protection of its fron-
iiers and those of the European Union, and the
fight against criminatity and illegal work. At the
same time, it called upon Albania to discuss the
conditions of a bilateral agreement in order to
control and normalise the movement of Albanian
citizens into Greece.
303. The Greek minority living in the south-
eastern part of Albania also called " North Epirus ",
is estimated by Albania to be 59 000, but Greece
claims 300 000. Independent estimates assert a
figure of 100 000 to 120 000'. Greece has argued
repeatedly that this Greek minority doeq not enjoy
anequal status and that, with regard to it, Albania
does not fully respect minority and human rights,
including rights to education and to practise one's
own religion in accordance with the articles of the
CSCE P-aris Charter. The Greek minority organi-
sation " Omonia " has alleged that Greeks are
being " terrorised ". This is denied by the Alba-
nian President, Sali Berisha, who stated that Alba-
nians and Greeks in his country are living in " full
harmony ".
304. Border incidents have been reported includ-
ing the exchange of small arms fre and Greece
hai reinforced its border guards with 6lite troops
and electronic surveillance equipment.
305. Nonvithstanding these problems, the Greek
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Karolos Papoulias,
paid a visit to Tirana on 15th November 1993 to
establish a co-operation programme between
Greece and Albania in such fields as economy,
trade, culture, transport and others. Greece is the
second-ranking foreign investor in Albania, after
Italy.
306. The worst incident took place on 10th April
1994 when truo Albanian soldiers were killed on
Albanian territory near the Greek-Albanian
border. A meeting between the Albanian and
Greek Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Zurich on
3rd May ended without agreement and on 20th
May, six ethnic Greeks, members of Omonia,
weie arrested in Albania and charged with
having links with secret Greek irredentist groups,
fomenting separation and illegal possession of
weapons. Five of them were convicted and impri-
soned for terms of between six and eight years.
57. Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
Statqs 1994, Europa Publications Ltd., London l994,page 106.
307. Meanwhile, Greece expelled 70 000 illegal
Albanian immigrants during August and September.
308. ln December, President Berisha pardoned
one of the convicts who was released immediately
and ordered that the prison sentences of the others
be reduced by between one and two years. Finally,
on 6th February 1995, Albania's appeals court
freed the remaining four Greeks and this further
reduced tension between the two countries.
309. On 13th March 1995, the Greek Foreign
Minister, Karolos Papoulias, met with the politi-
cal authorities in Tirana in order to re-establish
good relations with Albania. Discussions concen-
trated on a better control of the flow of illegal
Albanian immigrants to Greece, a clear deline-
ation of the mountainous Greek-A1banian border
and improved conditions for the Greek minority
living in Albania.
310. Greece and Albania have now taken the
f[st steps towards negotiations on a statute for
Albanian migrant workers in Greece. As proof of
its positive attitude, Albania recently allowed the
Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Albania to travel
to Greece for medical treatment. Finally, prepara-
tions have started for an official visit by the Greek
President, Costis Stefanopoulos.
(b) FYROM (Fornrer Yugoslav Republic of Momdania)
31 1. Another more serious dispute is that benveen
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM). Greece has accused the
FYROM of continuing to lay claim to part of
Greece's territory and using names and symbols,
such as the name " Macedonia o' and the star of
Vergina, which the Greeks maintain are part of
their national heritage. Consequently, in February
1994,Greece imposed a trade embargo at the port
of Salonika on goods bound for the FYROM, with
the exception of food, pharmaceutical products
and humanitarian aid.
312. The European Commission then brought an
action before the European Court, alleging that
Greece's actions were contrary to the Treaty of
Rome. Greece argued that the treaty entitled
member states to take unilateral measures in cer-
tain circumstances, even though they affected the
functioning of the common market.
31.3. The European Court has now.givel a preli-
minary opinion according to which the trade
embargo imposed by Greece did not breach the
Treaty of Rome. The advocate-general argued that
the safeguard clause in the treaty allowed a mem-
ber state to take unilateral action in the event of
war or serious international tension constituting a
threat of war.
314. It was also argued that the powers of the
court in such cases were extremely limited and
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that it was only able to decide whether, in light of
all the circumstances, Greece could have had
some basis for considering, from its own subjective
point of view, that the strained relations between
itself and the FYROM could degenerate into
armed conflict.
315. A final court ruling is not expected before
July 1995. Greece has meanwhile recalled that
international bodies have taken earlier decisions
regarding the name, flag and state symbols of the
FYROM, in particular:
1. The decisions of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Community in Brussels on
16th December 1991 imposing three
conditions for recognition of the
FYROM:
(a) that it should make no territorial
claims on a neighbouring country,
member of the Community;
(b) that it should pursue no hostile pro-
paganda activity against a neigh-
bouring country, member of the
Community;
(c) that it should not use a denomin-
ation implying territorial claims.
2. T\e decision of the European Council in
Lisbon, 26th-27th June 1992, stipulat-
ing that recognition of the FYROM
would be under a name that did not
include the term Macedonia.
3. Security Council Resolution 817 of 7th
April 1993 authorising the accession of
that republic to the United Nations with
the provisional name of FYROM,
without flag or emblem.
316. Greece argues that these decisions have not
since been revoked or amended and that the Euro-
pean Union member states have established diplo-
matic relations with that country under the name
of FYROM.
3I7. Since Greece imposed its unilateral trade
embargo on the FYROM n 1994, the industrial
output ofthe country has dropped 9Vo.The econo-
mic situation in the FYROM had already deterio-
rated sharply through the United Nations sanc-
tions on Serbia-Montenegro which was its main
trading partner.
318. Trade routes through Albania offer only par-
tial relief due the inadequacy of the Albanian road
network, the shallow ports and their limited steve-
doring and storage capacity especially for oil and
its derivatives. Routing the flow of trade through
Bulgaria is so far the most viable available alterna-
tive although characterised by several drawbacks
such as long supply lines, limited availability of
trucks, higher transportation costs (50Vo) and long
waiting Iines at the border crossings in Gjusovo(two to ffieen hours), Zlatarevo (ttree dayi), and
the Ruse-Giurgiu bridge on the Danube, between
Romania and Bulgaria (one week).
319. The FYROM's gross domestic product in
1994 was less than half that of 1990. Registered
unemployment is approximately 30Vo, with an-
other 5Vo of the workforce being on forced leave.
320. The government estimates that the Greek
embargo has cost the counfrry $600 million, which
is a-pproximately half of its yearly export earnings
and equal to the count4r's foreign debt. On t6e
other hand, it is said that Greece itself has lost
more than $100 million in lost exports and port
dues at Thessaloniki.
321. Additional negative effects derive from the
sanctions imposed against Serbia-Montenegro st.
The FYROM government estimates that such
losses amount to $1.8 billion for the period May
1992 to May 1993 and $1.3 billion from June
1993 to June 1994. The disastrous economic
effects of the United Nations sanctions against
Serbia-Montgnegro and the Greek embargo go
hand in hand with ruinous social consequences.
The government of FYROM argued that a number
of factories had to be closed completely or partially
and that many more are workjng at a loss. The
unemploymentrate is38.3%o, with 185 000 unem-
ployed and 60 000 on extended vacation. A total
of 129 000 employed have not received any sala-
ry for months. 
-
322. The United Nations-sponsored talks
between representatives of the Greek and FYROM
Governments but they were frozen in June 1994
because of elections in both countries. Prospects
fol q compromise have improved with the eclipse
of the Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Move-
ment (VMRO), which boycotred the October
1994 parliamentary elections, but no progress has
since been made, nor was there any headway at a
meeting in Geneva on 7th November 1994
between the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Cyrus Vance and
President Kiro Gligorov. The FYROM's Prime
Minister, Branko Crvenkovski, recently said that
his country was willing to compromise on the
flag, but that the government was adamant on
using the Republic of Macedonia as its name.
323. In a positive development, on the other
hand, it should be noted that the FYROM has met
the targets of the IMF stabilisation plan, its annual
inflation rate having fallen from 25OVo in 1993 to
58Vo in 1994 and, the budget deficit being cut from
l0%o to 3.5Vo of the gross domestic product. An
58. It is known that the United Nations is ignoring large-
scale sanction violations by FYROM in order to mitigate [he
effecs of the combined Gieek embargo and United [tations
sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro.
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IMF standby loan of $50 million should become
available in 1995.
324. The FYROM's privatisation progralnme,
having been delayed for almost three years, was
started recently in response to pressure from the
World Bank and the IMF. The government has
now undertaken to dispose of more than 900 state-
controlled and " socially owned " enterprises,
including tobacco, food processing, hotel and tou-
rism companies and textile manufacturers.
325. The FYROM regrets not having been
included in the European Stability Pact, which
was concluded in Paris on 20th March 1994. As a
consequence of a Greek veto, the FYROM has
also been prevented from becoming a member of
the OSCBand is concerned that such marginalis-
ation from international institutions and agree-
ments could lead to destabilisation. Several Euro-
pean states have repeatedly expressed their
ioncern at the FYROM's exclusion from the
OSCE and urged the Greek Government to lift its
veto, but these efforts have so far been to no avail.
Greece will maintain this veto as long as the
FYROM remains intransigent on the use of its
present flag and national emblem.
326. A solution to the bilateral dispute between
Greece and the FYROM would enable the Euro-
pean Union to develop its relations with the latter,
forexample by concluding a trade and co-operation
agreement and, through that, also enhance
FYROM's security. Meanwhile, some United
Nations soldiers are deployed at the FYROM's bor-
der with Serbia-Montenegro in order to protect any
spill-over of armed operations in other parts of for-
mer Yugoslavia into the tenitory of the FYROM.
327. President Clinton's national security advi-
sor, Anthony Lake, has said that there was oo an
option " to enlarge the 55O-member United States
army observation team in the FYROM to a total
of 2 000 troops, which could be seen as a symbol
of the Unitedstates' commitrnent to contain war-
fare in the region. He made it clear, however, that
the United States would not actually use these
troops to contain the conflict, but would continue
to rely on sanctions and diplomacy. The United
States has not yet established full diplomatic rela-
tions with the FYROM, although many observers
take the view that a decision to do so would
contribute significantly to political stability. So
far, Serbia-Montenegro has refused to recognise
the FYROM because it considers Macedonia to be
part of what remains of former Yugoslavia.
(c) Bulgaria
328. After the fall of the Colonels' r6gime in
1974, the development of a special relationship
with Bulgaria became one of the priorities of the
new Greek Government's foreign policy.
329. Having a long shared history of Ottoman
rule, a period when Greece and Bulgaria were
frequently at odds over territorial claims, the two
countries shared a common concern over a pos-
sible Tirrkish threat which they also connected
with the presence of an increasingly vocal Muslim
Turkish minority within their borders. Both coun-
fties also considered the existence of a o' Republic
of Macedonia ", created by Tito as one of the
constituent republics of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, a destabilising factor in the region
sinie, in their view, the name oo Macedonia "
implied territorial claims against Greece and
Bulgaria.
330. In 1989, after the collapse of the com-
munist rdgime in Bulgaria, the Communist Party
(rebaptised Socialist Puay), which remained in
power, maintained friendly relations with Greece
untit the victory of the anti-communist oppo-
sition in the October 1991 elections. The Presi-
dent who was then elected, Jelyu Jelev, and his
Prime Ministet Filip Dimitrov, re-established the
rights of the Turkish minority organised within
the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF)'.
Mr. Jelev advocates inter-ethnic peace as a stabi-
lising factor for the new democracy. The new
democratic government, also relying on the pre-
dominantly ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights
and Freedoms, attached great importance to
improving relations with Turkey. It was Qoggllt
that such policy would reduce the massive Tirrkish
armed threat on Bulgaria's southern border and
result in economic assistance from Turkey
for Bulgaria's battered economy. Several agtee-
ments were signed and good-neighbourly rela-
tions between Bulgaria and Turkey have been
established o.
331. It should be noted, however, that when the
Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, visited Sofia in
February 1993, President Jeliou Jelev had recalled
that Bulgaria would oppose the passage of Ttrkish
soldiers sent to Bosnia. He also insisted on the
Black Sea economic co-operation area not being
transformed into a political forum.
332. The easing of tension on its southern border
with Turkey enabled Bulgaria to pay more atten-
tion to developments on its western border. It
stressed that the Balkans would be destabilised if
Macedonia was not recognised as independent
and, in January l992,Bulgaia was one of the first
to recognise Macedonia as an independent state
under that name, stating that Bulgaria had no ter-
59. This group is placed between the Socialist party and the
anti-communist opposition grouped in the Union of Demo-
cratic Forces (UDF).
60. In December 1991, a military co-operation agreement
was signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, followed by a
treaty of friendship, good-neighbourly relations, co-oper-
ation and security in May 1992 and by another military co-
operation agreement in November 1992.
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ritorial claims on it. In February, it added that full
diplomatic relations would be established only if
the republic declared officially that there was no
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and that it had
no territorial claims on Bulgiia.
333. Meanwhile, Bulgaria and Greece conclud-
ed agreements on military co-operation in
November 1991 and January 1992, envisaging
exchanges between the two armies, reduction oT
the.parameters of their military activities and pro-
visions for confidence-building measures of a
more stringent nature than those required by the
Vienna document. Bulgaria also stated at thqtime
that relations with Greece would improve since
both countries had no alternative.
334. The considerably-improved relations bet-
ween Bulgaria and Turkey may have slightly
embarrassed Greece and conffibuted to its feeling
of isolation in the Balkans. On the other hand, it ii
aware that it shares interests with Bulgaria as
regards stability in the region. The coming to
power of a new government under Prime Minis-
ter, Jan Videnov, who did not have to rely on the
support of the Movement for Rights and Free-
doms, was welcomed by Greece.
335. Both Greece and Bulgaria have declared
that they wish to improve the already very good
relations between the two states, but no new ini-
tiatives have been taken in the past two years. It
should be noted, however, that at presenf Greece
is the first-ranking foreign investor in Bulgaria,
with Germany in second position.
II. Greece's perception of Turkey
as a security threat
336. Since its independence in 1830, Greece has
always felt uncomfortable with its new neighbour
and former occupying power, the Ottoman empire,
later transformed into Turkey. Several armed
conflicts opposed the two states, the most savage
of which was the Greek-Turkish war of 1920-
l922,whichended with the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923, including an agreement for the compulsory
exchange of 600 000 muslim Turks and 1.5 mii-
lion orthodox Greeks.
337. The second world war, followed by a com-
munist rebellion and civil war which ended only
in 1949 and the threat posed by the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact, concentrated priorities on
other issues. Both Greece and Turkey became
NATO allies and there were some yqrs of relative
calm in bilateral relations.
138. Soon, however, in the mid 1950s, Cyprus
became the new disintegrating influence ana in
1974 the Turkish invasion and subsequent occu-
pation of the northern part of Cyprus reinnoduced
Turkey as the most important potential military
threat to Greece. The fact that NATO did not act to
grole.ct the Greek Cypriots against the invading
Turkish armed forces did not increase NATOI
popularity which was already very low because of
its close links with the Colonels' r6gime during
the years 1967-74.
3]9, Greece points out thar in the early 1990s
Turkey started to implement an ambitious and
wide-ranging modernisation and restructuring
prograrnme for its armed forces while its national
military-industrial base was enlarged and is now
able to build fighter and tranSport aircraft,
armoured fighting vehicles, frigates and electro-
nic equipment. Efforts are being made to develop
a production capacity for tanks, missiles and heli-
copters.
340. Greece is also worried about Turkey's fVth
army, not assigned to NATO, and equipped with
the largest non-ocean-going landing foice in the
world (110 ships) which is deployed ar Turkey's
western border, facing the Greek Aegean islands.
It does not exclude the possibility of a Turkish
seizure of Greek islands in the eastern part of the
Aegean. Referring to Article 51 of the United
Nations' Charter, Greece has fortified and milita-
rised a number of its Aegean islands as a measure
of self-defence and to function as a tripwire in
case of a Turkish attack. According to Greece,
large units of Turkey's armed forces are also posi-
tioned in the coastal area facing Cyprus, ready to
move into action if need be. A large proportioir of
the Turkish armed forces is also deptoyed in the
region facing north-eastern Greece, where the
Muslim minority lives.
34I. An important new element in the increased
lurkish security threat as perceived by Greece is
Turkey's effort to play an active r6le in the Bal-
kans, based on the presence of Muslim minorities
in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYROM
and Kosovo and of minorities of Turkish descent
in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Greece and Romania.
Greece takes the view that Turkey's objective is to
create a oo green " or islamic belt from the Adriatic
to the Black Sea which would isolate Greece from
Christian Europe. Even if this may be an inflated
view of reality, it has had an important influence
on Greece's Balkan policy and defence posture.
342. At present, only nationalistic extemists in
Tirrkey would mention the possibility of Turkish
intervention in north-eastern Greece in order to
" liberate " the 120 OO0-strong Muslim minority
living there, consisting of 49.9Vo Turkish Mus-
Lims,33.5Vo Pomaks and l6.5Vo gypsies. Greece
nonetheless takes into consideration that Turkish
territorial aspirations could emerge and pose a
threat to Greek security, the more so since the
Muslim minority in Bulgaria is mainly concen-
trated in a nearby area across the Greek-Bulgarian
border.
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III. Defence spending and defence policy
(a) Defence sPending in Greece
343. Since the return of a democratic govemment
in 1974, there has been a widespread consensus on
the need to upgrade Greece's defence capability
and the corresponding highJevel defence expendi-
ture, justified by suspicions as regards T!t\gy,
which had invaded Cyprus in the summer of 1974.
During the last years of the cold war perio4 Greece
ranked frst among NATO countries in military
expenditure as related to GDP.
3/H.. A national defence industrial base was
developed in order to satisfy at least part of the
needs of the Greek armed forces and to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers. Additionally,
lower arms imports limited the drain on culrency
reserves while export markets were actively
explored to improve Greece's balance of trade.
345. In the late 1980s, the deteriorating national
economy and the depreciation of the Greek drachma
strongly affected the Defence Ministry's purchas-
ing power. At the same time, it appeared that the
development of an all-round modern national
defence industry was not succeeding, since it was
able to produce oriy 20Vo of Greece's armaments.
346. The government decided to restructure the
defence industry, including privatisation and
mergers. Large cuts in defence expenditure were
thought inevitable, but they were postponed as a
result of the war in neighbouring former Yugosla-
via. Simultaneously, Greece received large quan-
tities of modern equipment as a result of CFE
reductions of equipment in other NATO member
states.
347. Greece received 80 M-60 tanks from the
United States and Gerrrany is transferringTll-en-
pard-l tanks, 200 M-l13 armoured personnel car-
riers, 500 BMP-I armoured fighting vehicles,
72 Nl-ll} self-propelled guns, 150 RM-70 mul-
tiple-rocket launchers and 20 multiple-launch
rocket systems. The Netherlands transferred
60 M-106A1 mortar carriers. Moreover, 17 AH-
lP Cobra attack helicopters together with 24 AH-
64 Apache attack helicopters are to be delivered
in 1995.
348. Greece has adopted a system of compul-
sory military service for all men and voluntary-
service for men and women. The breakdown of
military personnel is as follows t':
349. Greece also receives significant military
assistance from the United States, which is meant
to contribute to a balance of forces between
Greece and Tirkey on a 7:10 ratio. Foreign mililary
assistance, which includes both foreign military
financing and international military education and
training, amounted to $315.3 million in 1993,
$283.6hil1ionin 1994 and $317 million in 1995.
(b) The rdb of the Greek navy in the Medilenanean
350. Through its geographic position, Greece
has an important r6le in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean. [t is the sfrategic link between Italy and Tur-
key on Europe's southern flank. It controls the sea
lines of communication in the Aegean and the
movement of naval forces to and from the Black
Sea. Moreover, it provides the Atlantic Alliance
with important military bases in the area.
351. The areas of immediate interest for the Hel-
lenic naval forces are the Aegean and Ionian Seas
with the corresponding accesses or passages and
the sea area extending south-south-west of Crete
and east-south-east of Rhodes. Greece considers
the Aegean Sea as constituting an inseparable
unique entity wittr the Greek mainland, the conffol
of which it considers vital for the survival of Greece
and for the security of Europe as a whole. The sfra-
tegic importance of the island of Crete as a main
maritime base for the southern flank of Europe and
the alliance was proven once again during the Gulf
war while the Ioirian Sea is vital for the control of
the Adriatic and security in the Balkans.
352. In order to enable the Hellenic navy to
implement its many different tasks, Greece has
initiated a long-term modernisation and develop-
ment programme, ranging from the areas of C3,
through air defence, anti-submarine, anti-surface
and mine warfare to the areas of electronic warfare
and logistic support. The new structure should
provide the Hellenic navy with maximum flexi-
bitity and rapid reaction capability. The navy is to
include several types of ships, rather than single-
mission ships, which should, insofar as possible,
be platforms with multi-mission capabilities.
353. Recently, two Katsonis (United States
Guppy-class) submarines and two Themistocles(United States Gearing-class) destroyers have
been retired from service. A fifth Elli (Nether-
lands Kortenaer) frigate has been commissioned,
as have two I Votis-class (German Tiger-class)
fast patrol craft, armed with Exocet SSM, and two
Greek-built Pirpolitis-class coastal patrol craft .
354. From the United States, it received three Uni-
ted States Knox-class frigates (on lease) and from
Germany it received a further three Thetis-class
anti-submarine warfare corvettes. The navy recent-
ly took delivery of one German-built Meko frigate
and another of this class is under construction.
Peacertmz Wartime
Army
Navy
Airforce
Total
126 000
t9 500
23 500
360 000
43 000
45 000
169 000 448 000
61. Source: Greek Ministry of Defence, March 1995.
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IV Greece andWEU
355. When the EC member states started to pre-
pare the intergovernmental conference on the
political union in 1990, there was almost general
agreement across the political spectrum in Greece
in favour of joining and further developing a
European defence and security system. It was
thought that such a system would protect all mem-
bers against external threats. Greece would as a
consequence be protected by this collective
defence mechanism against any possible threat
from Tlrkey. In this reasoning, a European defence
system, of which Ti.rkey would be a part, would
offer the perfect protection which NATO, with
Tirrkey as a member, could not provide.
356. At the Maastricht summit meeting in
December 1991, however, it appeared that nego-
tiations had resulted in conclusions which differed
from Greece's original expectations. The member
states of WEU invited Greece, as a member of the
European Union, to accede to WEU " on condi-
tions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI
of the modified Brussels Treaty ", but at the same
time they invited Turkey and other European
member states of NATO 'o to become associate
members of WEU in a way which will give them
the possibility of participating fully in the activi-
ties of WEU ".
357. In the accession negotiations with Greece,
some member states insisted on a modification of
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty in such
a way ttrat it would not apply to external attacks
by one NATO counfiry against another.
358. The Petersberg declaration of l9th June
1992 formulated this exception as follows: " They
(Ministers) also stressed that the security guaran-
tees and defence commitments in the treaties
which bind the member states within Western
European Union and which bind them within the
Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and
will not be invoked by those subscribing to
Part UI of the Petersberg declaration in disputes
between member states of either of the two
organisations. "
359. This specific amendment to Article V
which made the vital collective defence virtually
non-applicable to any form of conflict between
Greece and Turkey, combined with the status of
associate membership granted to Turkey, which
almost amounted to full participation of Turkey in
the WEU Council's activities, was quite different
from Greece's initial expectations. Although it
felt disappointed by the apparent lack of the other
European Union member states to provide protec-
tion and security guarantees against Tlrrkey, Greece
signed its protocol of accession to WEU on 20th
November 1992.
360. After ratification by all the signatories, the
protocol of accession entered into force on
6th March 1995. Since then, however, it became
known that in its notification of ratification as
registered at the Belgian Ministry for Foreign
Affairs on 10th June 1994, Greece itself has taken
exception to Article X of the modified Brussels
Treaty, declaring that for a period of five years it
" excludes from the competence of the Court any
dispute over the Hellenic Republic taking defen-
sive military measures for reasons of national
defence ".
36L. Apparently, this exclusion of the competence
of the International Court of Justice in the flrst
place refers to Greece's dispute with Tiukey over
the militarisation of the Aegean islands. Having
understood that its membership of WEU does not
provide any security guarantee against potential
Tirkish aggression, it has preferred also to exclude
the possibility of a verdict of the International
Court of Justice, forcing it to demilitarise the
Aegean islands.
362. Article X allows the High conftacting par-
ties to make reservations to the complusory juris-
diction of the Court, but it would seem that this
reservation should have been made at the moment
of signing the Protocol of Accession on 20th
November 1992 and not, as was done, at the time
of notifying ratification on 10th June 1994. Would
the other member states of WEU have signed and
ratified the protocol if they had been informed of
Greece's reservation?
363. The specific amendment to Article V and
the reservation to Article X, in connnection with
Greece's membership and Turkey's associate
membership, have weakened the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and the internal coherence of its mem-
ber states. One may wonder whether this opera-
tion has reinforced security in Europe.
364. Greece has repeatedly made it clear that it
perceives major potential threats at its northern
and eastern borders from the Balkans and Turkey.
With the FYROM and Tirrkey in particular, it is
involved in long-standing and serious disputes
over a multitude of issues, the solution of which is
by no means in sight. There is no decisive answer
to the question whether, and to what extent, the
other European Union and WEU member states
share its views. The establishment of a European
common security and defence policy urs announ-
ced in Article J of the Treaty on European Union,
is certainly hampered by the unresolved disputes
between Greece and its neighbours.
365. [f Greece wishes to play a positive r6le in
the Balkans and to make a contribution towards
the European Union's policy in the region, it will
have to make progress in the direction of a nor-
malised relationship with Turkey.
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Panr Tlnrn: Cvpnus
I. The political situation
366. The situation in Cyprus, where for many
decades the Greek and Turkish communities have
been opposed in a bitter dispute, is a key issue in
relations between Turkey and Greece. Recent
efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General
to reconcile the positions of both communities on
the island have not led to any breakthrough.
A reconciliation now seems to be more urgent
than ever in view of the fact that the European
Union has fixed a date for the start of negotiations
on the application for membership which was
deposited by the Republic of Cyprus on 3rd July
1990. The rapid decline in the economy and stan-
dard of living in the northern part of the island is
another reason for reconciliation.
367. Without going into too much detail, some
recent events in the history of Cyprus should be
recalled here. u'
368. In February L959, agreements signed in
Zlrich and London between representatives of
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and of
the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus
paved the way for the independence of the Repu-
blic of Cyprus which came into being on 16th
August 1960.
369. According to the 1960 Constitution, the Pre-
sident should be a Greek Cypriot, while the Vice-
President should be a Turkish Cypriot, each elected
by their own community. Each had a veto right on
vital issues such as foreign affairs and defence.
370. In government and in legislative bodies,
Greeks and Ttrks would share responsibilities on
a70Vo-30Vo basis. According to the 1960 census,
the Greek community accounted for 77Vo and the
Turkish community I8.3Vo of the total Cypriot
population.
371. In 1963, the Greek Cypriot proposals to
change the constitution were rejected by the Tur-
kish Cypriots, while at the same time, Greek
Cypriots officially declared their political objective
to unite Cyprus with Greece (the so-called Enosis).
372. Following violent clashes between the two
communities in 1963 and 1964, the United
Nations Security Council decided in March 1964
to dispatch a United Nations peace-keeping force
62. A report on the situation in Cyprus, submitted by Lord
Finsberg, Rapporteur, on behalf of the Political Affairs Com-
mittee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe was discussed in that Assembly on 2nd February
1995.
On llth February 1994, the European Parliament
adopted a report submitted by Mr. Jan Willem Bertens, Rap-
porteur, on the application for membership of the European
Union by Cyprus.
(UNFICYP) to Cyprus. The peace-keeping force
is still present in Cyprus but for financial reasons
it has been considerably reduced to the present
number of around 1 200 troops.
373. ln 1967, the Turkish-Cypriot community
established its own provisional administration in
those parts of the island where Turkish-Cypriots
were in a majority.
374. On 15th July 1974, the Cypriot National
Guard committed a successful coup d'6tat against
President Makarios, organised by the Greek mili-
tary junta. The putsch collapsed when a few days
later the Turkish Government intervened milita-
rily. Following the breakdown of the Augustl9T4
negotiations, in which Greece, Tirkey, the United
Kingdom and the Greek and Tilrkish communities
of Cyprus participated, Turkish troops occupied
the northern 377o of the island causing the migra-
tion of 200 000 Greek Cypriots to the southern
part and the de facto division into two parts, sepa-
rated by a demarcation line 6'. Moreover, demo-
graphic problems have increased with the policy
of colonisation pursued by the so-called Tirrkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus in collaboration
with Turkey *.
375. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots uni-
laterally and illegally declared their own indepen-
dent state, which was rebaptised the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in Novem-
ber 1983 and recognised only by Turkey.
376. Since 1975, the United Nations, through its
Secretary-General has made many efforts to solve
the Cyprus question, including two high-level
agreements reached in Vienna n 1977 and 1979,
which set out the framework for a solution on a
federal basis.
377. ln 1992, a new impulse was given to the
United Nations initiatives to reconcile the posi-
tions of the Greek and Turkish communities. The
results of these activities are discussed in detail in
the abovementioned reports of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the
European Parliament.
378. The United Nations Secretary-General has
proposed a number of confidence-building mea-
sures which, if accepted by both parties, could
help to achieve an overall agreement based on a
" set of ideas " approved by the United Nations
Security Council.
379. An essential part of the confidence-build-
ing measures is the rehabilitation of the Varosha
63. See the report on national refugees and missing persons
in Cyprus, by Messrs. Riesen and Miiller, Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 5716.
64. See the report on the demographic structure of the
Cypriot communities by Mr. Cuc6, Rapporteur, Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 6589.
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area north of the United Nations administered
buffer zone, at present surrounded by territory
controlled by the Turkish Cypriot administration,
as an area for trade and intercommunity contacts
and the re-opening of Nicosia international airport
to civilian passenger and cargo traffic.
380. One of the guiding principles of the overall
agreement is based on the " set of ideas ", the
establishment by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot communities of a bi-communal and bi-
zonal federation, comprising one territory com-
posed of two politically equal federated states.
This federal republic would have one indivisible
sovereignty.
381. Although progress has been made in pro-
tracted negotiations between the parties concern-
ed, many questions still remain to be settled.
No agreement has been reached on the vital confi-
dence-building measures relating to Varosha and
Nicosia International airport. One of the other
remaining stumbling-blocks is the question of
territorial adjustments. The Turkish part of the
population, representing lSVo of the total popula-
tion, now occupies 37Vo of the island. According
to the United Nations Secretary-General, they
should reduce their portion of land to 28.02Vo btt
the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Mr. Denktash,
considers 29Vo to be the minimum.
382. Since May 1994, negotiations between the
two communities have remained deadlocked. In a
report of 30th N.llay 1994 to the Security Council,
the United Nations Secretary-General stated that
the absence of an agreement was due mainly to a
lack of political will by the Turkish Cypriot side.
383. Informal meetings between President
Clerides and Mr. Denktash in October 1994 were
concluded without any result.
384. In January 1995, I\{r. Denktash announced
a 14-point proposal to break the deadlock with the
Greek Cypriots. The proposal included acceptance
of the United Nations proposed confidence-
building measures, eventual demilitarisation of
the island and the exchange of territory, but
Mr. Denktash admitted that it did not signify a
change in attitude or policy.
Mr. Denktash also excluded the possibility of
Greek Cypriots returning to their former homes in
the northern part of the island.
385. On 6th March 1995, when the European
Union concluded a customs union agreement with
Turkey, it was also agreed that negotiations for
accession would start on the basis of proposals by
the Commission six months after the conclusion
of the 1996 conference and taking into account
the results of the latter. Although it was not men-
tioned in any official document, it is hoped that
this promise of future membership could work as
a catalyst to end the stalemate in negotiations
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on an
overall agreement. In its communique of 6th
March 1995, the European Council confirms that
the European Union intends to continue to up-
hold, by all the means at its disposal, the efforts of
the United Nations with a view to a comprehensive
settlement of the Cypriot question.
386. In fact, the first reactions to the agreement
were far from promising and Turkish political lea-
ders seem to indulge in muscled declarations, pos-
sibly only for domestic consumption. Only hours
after having signed the agreement, the Turkish
Foreign Minister, Murat Karayalcin, stated that
the European Union's decision on Cyprus' mem-
bership was an " unfortunate step " which could
lead to the permanent division of the island. He
said that if accession negotiations were held with
the Greek Cypriot side of the island, Turkey
" would be left with no option other than to take
steps towards achieving a similar integration with
the Turkish Republic and Northern Cyprus " 65.
387. Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, when visiting
the United States in April 1995, suggested that a
solution to the Cyprus problem would be found
after Turkey becomes a member of the European
Union *.
388. Both Turkey's government officials and
Mr. Denktash have declared repeatedly that they
consider the request for membership of the Euro-
pean Union by the Republic of Cyprus as an ille-
gal act since, under the terms of the Constitution,
the Republic of Cyprus cannot become part of
another alliance or union without the consent of
both communities. This refers to Article 50(a)
of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus
which reads as follows:
" 1. The President and the Vice-President
of the Republic, separately or con-jointly, shall have the right of final
veto on any law or decision of the
House of Representatives or any part
thereof concerning:
(a) foreign affairs, except the particip-
ation of the Republic in international
organisations and pacts of alliance in
which the Kingdom of Greece and the
Republic of Turkey both participate. "
389. The Republic of Cyprus has dismissed this
argument, noting that a decision to join the Euro-
pean Union would be subject to a referendum, in
which case the right of final veto does not apply.
Moreover, it is argued that the Turkish Cypriots
cannot refer to a clause in a constitution which
they have otherwise unilaterally and fully reject-
ed, and that Turkey itself applied for membership
of the European Union in 1987.
65. Financial Times, Sth March 1995.
66. International Herald Tribune, 19th April 1995.
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390. It should be noted that, as a consequence of
its complete dependence on Tlrkey, the economy
of the northern part of the island is in a drama-
tically bad shape with an inflation rate of 2157o
for 1994 and a decrease of 34Vo in tourism com-
pared to the precedingyear with only 70 000 tou-
rists. Moreover, the export of food products,
including citrus fruit, to the European Union has
practically come to a standstill as a consequence
of a ruling of the European Court of Justice. There
have also been increasing intemrptions in the sup-
ply of electric energy from the south, purportedly
of a technical nature. In fact, economic problems
may be a reason for the Ttrkish Cypriots to change
their attitude.
391. [t seems that a majority of the Turkish
Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is
ever more anxious for a settlement which would
lift the trade embargo. Furthermore, it is thought
that future membership of the European Union
could bring considerable regional aid to the ruined
economy of the north.
392. Meanwhile, the economy of the southern
part is in good shape with estimated figures for
1994 of 4.7Vo economic gtowth, 2.5Vo unemploy-
ment and 4.7Vo inflatron. In 1994, the Republic of
Cyprus registered 2 million tourists in 1994. The
present per capita income is higher than that of
Pornrgal and Greece and at the same level as that
of Spain.
393. On 23rd April 1995, the presidential elec-
tions in northern Cyprus resulted in a victory for
Mr. Rauf Denktash with 62.5Vo of the 91 000
votes cast in a second round of voting, with Mr.
Dervis Eroglu taking the remaining3T.SVo.In the
preceding 1990 elections, Mr. Denktash was
elected with 66.7Vo in the first round.
II. The military sitaatinn
394. On numerous occasions, the Security
Council has insisted on a reduction in the number
of foreign troops and a reduction of defence
spending on the island. Recently in Resolution
969, adopted on 21st December l995,iturged:
" All concerned to commit themselves to a
significant reduction in the number of
foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus
and a reduction of defence spending in the
Republic of Cyprus to help restore confi-
dence between the parties and as a frst step
towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot
forces as set out in the Set of Ideas, and
(calted) upon the Secretary-General to pro-
mote efforts in this direction. "
Unfortunately, no progtess has been made on this
issue and developments have been rather in the
opposite direction.
395. On lTth December 1993, President CIe-
rides made a proposal for demilitarising the island
which included: disbanding the National Guard
and transferring all of its arms and military equip-
ment to the custody of UNFICYP; maintaining
the Cyprus Police at its present strength, equipped
with light weapons; defraying the total cost of an
enlarged United Nations peace-keeping force that
would have rights of inspection; use by that
peace-keeping operation of heavy National Guard
equipment in its custody; all money saved from
disbanding the National Guard and from disconti-
nued arms purchases would be deposited in a
United Nations account and, after deducting the
cost of a United Nations peace-keeping operation,
be used for the benefit of both communities after
the solution of the Cyprus problem. President
Clerides added the condition that the Turkish
forces be withdrawn from Cyprus, the Turkish
Cypriot forces disbanded and their weapons and
military equipment placed in the custody of the
United Nations peace-keeping force.
396. Mr. Denktash reacted by calling President
Clerides' proposal impractical and propagandistic
and declared: " Turkish forces, other than those to
be retained under the updated Treaties of Guaran-
tee and of Alliance, will withdraw from Cyprus
within the framework of a lasting solution, which
can only be realised if mutual confidence is esta-
blished between the two peoples on the island ".
It is noted here that the actual military situation
can hardly inspire mutual confidence.
397. In the northern part of the island, Tirrkey
has deployed a number of ffoops estimated well
in excess of 30 000, equipped with more than
300 tanks. The armament of these Turkish forces
has recently been upgraded and equipment also
includes armoured personnel carriers, conside-
rable fuepower in different categories of artillery
and helicopters. The active Turkish Cypriot
armed forces count 4 000 infantry troops.
398. The National Guard of the Republic of
Cyprus has 10 000 personnel in active service. The
equipment includes 52 tanks, armoured personnel
carriers and a wide variety of artillery air defence
missiles and guns, and anti-tank weaponry.
Moreover, there are estimated to be in excess of
2 000 Greek personnel composed of the ELDYK
regiment, provided for under the 1960 Treaty of
Alliance and individual personnel assigned sepa-
rately therefrom to Cyprus.
399. Since 1988, successive governments of the
Republic of Cyprus have been implementing a
programme of armaments acquisition to enhance
significantly the equipment operated by the
National Guard, which has resulted in a large
increase in defence spending by the Republicu'.
67. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
operation in Cyprus, Securiry Council documents 5/19941680
(7th June 1994) andsllgg4ll407 (l2th December 1994).
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Panr Foun:
Drsptrrns BETwEEN Ttmrcv axo GnrpcB
I. Dispates in the Aegean Sea
(a) The Aegean islnnds
400. Since the birth of Greece as a state in 1830,
most of the islands in the Aegean sea have gra-
dually come under Greek sovereignty.
401. Italy occupied the islands of the Dodecanese,
then still under Ottoman rule, and Greece took the
northern and central islands in the eastern part of
the Aegean Sea during the Balkan war of l9l2-
13. In February 1914, the six European powers 68
left the Dodecanese to Italy by tacit agreement
and decided to leave Greece in possession of the
other islands with the exception of Imroz, Tene-
dos and Castellorizo, under the condition that all
the islands left to Greece would be demilitarised.
A final settlement of the legal status of the eastern
Aegean island was reached in the Treaties of Lau-
sanne of 24th Jaly 1923, between Turkey, the
European allies and Greece.
402. The Dodecanese and Castellorizo came
under Greek sovereignty through the Paris Peace
Treaty of 10th February 1947.
403. At present, 2 383 islands in the Aegean sea
are under Greek sovereignty, while some sixty
islands, mostly situated within the three mile
zone of the Anatolian coast, are under Turkish
sovereignty.
(b) The status of the Greek ixlands in the Aegean Sea
4M. The governments of Greece and Turkey are
involved in a long-standing dispute over the status
of restrictions imposed upon islands in the
Aegean Sea. A distinction is made between three
different categories of islands, each of which has
a different status.
(i) Lemnos and Samothrace
405. The statute of these islands was initially
determined by the Convention on the r6gime of
straits, signed in Lausanne on 24th Jtily 1923,
which according to Article 4, had imposed the
demilitarisation of the Greek islands Limnos
and Samothraki and also of the Tirrkish islands
Gdkgeada (Imroz), Bozcaada (Tenedos) and the
Rabbit islands (Iles-aux-Lapins). Later, in the
Montreux Convention on the r6gime of straits
signed on 20th July 1936, the contracting parties
stipulated that they had resolved to substitute the
present convention for the one signed in Lausanne
on24thJuly 1923.
68. Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the
United Kingdom.
406. Following the conclusion of the Montreux
Convention, both countries gradually started to
remilitarise the abovementioned islands and with
the increasing problems between Greece and Tur-
key over Cyprus the status of the islands became
one of the disputes to which no solution has yet
been found.
407. Turkey argues that the Montreux Conven-
tion has not completely replaced the Lausanne
Convention and only provides Turkey with the
right to remilitarise the islands and territories
which have been recognised as being part of the
defensive system of the Sraits. It also argues that
the remilitarisation of Lemnos and Samothrace by
Greece has not been authorised in the Montreux
Convention.
408. Greece, on the other hand, argues that the
Montreux Convention has fully replaced the Lau-
sanne Convention and that any exception as
regards the status of any specific island would
have been mentioned. Moreover, Greece has
pointed out that immediately after the signing of
the Montreux Convention, Turkey recognised, in
several different oftrcial declarations, the right of
Greece to remilitarise its islands in the straits.
409. In the framework of NATO, Turkey has
used its veto whenever the alliance has proposed
to use Lemnos for operational purposes and to
include it in its military planning.
(ii) Izsbos, Chios, Sdmos and Nil<aria
410. The military status of these islands is sub-ject to the Lausanne Peace Treaty, signed on24th
July 1923, which states in Article 13, paragraph 3:
" The Greek military forces in the said
islands will be limited to the normal contin-
gent called up for military service, which
can be trained on the spot, as well as to a
force of gendarmerie and police in propor-
tion to the force of gendarmerie and police
existing in the whole of the Greek territory. "
The Treaty also stipulates that the two countries'
military aircraft are forbidden to fly over these
islands and over the Turkish coast and the
construction of arsenals and fortifications is pro-
hibited.
4ll. Since 1974, following the Turkish invasion
of Cyprus, the situation has changed drastically
and in 1974, 1976 and 1987 there were serious
crises in the Aegean Sea over the mere existence
and limits of the continental shelf of the Greek
islands.
(iii) Dodecanese
412. In Articles 15 and 16 of the Lausanne Peace
Treaty of 24th Jnly 1923, Turkey gave up its
rights over the islands of the Dodecanese and they
were given to Italy. After the second world war,
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Italy handed the Dodecanese over to Greece in
accordance with Article 14 of Section V of the
Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 10th February
1947. Tltrs same Peace Treaty put resftictions on
the militarisation of these islands which were res-
pected by Greece lur':rtil 1974, when Ttrkey inva-
ded Cyprus. After this event, Greece invoked its
inalienable right of self-defence as codified in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to
remilitarise the Dodecanese.
(c) The limits of teninrinlwalen
413. In Article 3 of the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, it is stated that:
" Every state has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured
from baselines determined in accordance
with this Convention. "
414. While Greece now considers the twelve-
mile zone as a generally-accepted no[n, Turkey
does not want to recognise it and remains hostile
to any unilateral extension of Greek territorial
waters beyond the present six miles. Turkey
insists that the limits of the territorial waters bet-
ween Greece and Turkey should be determined
according to the principle of equity 6e. In the
Mediterranean, only Turkey and Israel do not
recognise an extension of territorial waters
beyond 6 miles.
415. Turkey has gone so far as to say that an
extension of Greek territorial waters beyond 6
miles would be a casus belli and it has put forward
a number of arguments to support its position.
416. The fust is that Turkey does not recognise
the twelve- mile zone as a generally-accepted rule
of law. It has noted that even if the twelve-mile
zone were international common law its obser-
vance depends on the agreement of states and that
Turkey has always opposed this common law'0.
4I7. Finally, Turkey invokes Article 300 of the
1982 convention, regarding abuse of law, arguing
that in closed or semi-closed waters, as those
around its coastline, the twelve- mile zone cannot
be applied. With the abusive application of the
twelve-mile zone in the Aegean Sea, this would
simply become a " Greek lake ".
418. Notwithstanding the legal battle, it should
be noted that the question of territorial waters
between Greece and Turkey is mentioned in the
69. The principle of equity in international law is normally
applied to limit a continental shelf or an exclusive economic
zone.
70. It should be noted, however, that in the protocol of lTth
April 1973 on the limits of territorial waters in the Black Sea,
signed between Ttrrkey and the USSR, the border of both
countries had been fixed at the twelve-mile zone.
Treaty of Lausanne of 24th July 1923. Maps
attached to the British edition of the proceedings
of the Lausanne conference provide the specific
dividing line of the waters between the two coun-
tries, which is the central line between the Anato-
lian coast and the Greek islands opposite. In fact,
ever since then, this has been observed as the
borderline. The borderline between the Anatolian
coast and the Dodecanese was determined in the
agreements of 4th January 1932 and 28th Decem-
ber 1932.
419. As regards the waters at the mouth of the
Evros (Maritsa) river, a protocol was signed on
3rd November 1926 which determined the border
on the central line of the main navigation canal of
the river in a south-western direction for up to
three miles. There is no dispute over this matter.
420. In November 1994, there was growing ten-
sion between Greece and Turkey when the lnter-
national Convention on the Law of the Sea came
into force on 16th November 1994.The Turkish
armed forces held an aeromaritime exercise in the
Aegean Sea, while simultaneously the Greek
armed forces held exercises in the southern part of
the Aegean Sea.
421. Tension was lowered, however, when on
17th November the Greek Government made an
official declaration that the date of the coming
into force of the convention had no specific
importance and that its ratification by Greece
would not have immediate consequences,
although Greece did not renounce the right to
extend its territorial waters.
kl) The continental shelf
422. At present, the continental shelf is a mari-
time zone of 200 miles bordering on the coast
officially attributed to each coastal state where
this state holds sovereign rights concerning explo-
ration, exploitation, conservation and manage-
ment of natural resources. In recent years, this has
become an institution of common international
law which is also being called an exclusive eco-
nomic zone.
423. Since 1961, Greece has awarded explora-
tion permits in the Aegean Sea west of the Greek
islands. In 1973 ard 1974" however, the Turkish
Government awarded exploration permits to the
national Turkish oil company which allowed it to
search for natural resources in areas which Greece
considers to belong to its own jurisdiction.
424. The ensuing dispute over the continental
shelf in the Aegean Sea has not yet been settled.
Greece unilaterally laid the matter before the
International Court of Justice on 10th August
1976,but because of lack of competence due to
the fact that Turkey has refused to attend, the
Court cannot rule on this matter. Greece considers
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this as a legal dispute over the limits of the conti*
nental shelf which does not concern the vital stra-
tegic or political interests of both counffies. T\r-
key, on the other hand, considers it to be a highly
political dispute which concerns the vital interests
of both countries and the whole of their territorial
and political relations.
(e) Air space and related mafrerc
(i) Air space
425. In the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, it is stipulated that the sovereignty of coastal
states also relates to the air space above its territo-
rial waters. Unlike the rules for ships, however,
there is no inoffensive right of passage for air-
craft.
426. According to the Greek law of 1931 on
civil aviation, the state exerts its full sovereignty
over the air space above its territory, which also
includes its territorial waters. In application of
this law, Greece adopted in 1931 a decree extend-
ing its territorial waters to ten miles for questions
regarding aviation and police.
427. This extension has been contested by Tur-
key since 1974 with the argument that it is not
compatible with the Chicago convention of 7th
December 1994. According to Turkey, both the
tenitorial waters and air space of Greece cannot
extend beyond six miles from the coastline. Tur-
kish military aircraft quite frequently penetrate
Greek air space without notice.
(ii) Flight information region
428. Since 1952, the air space over the Aegean
Sea is part of the flight information region of
Athens according to an agreement, adopted by the
ICAO Council, which divided the FIRs of Athens
and Istanbul, mainly on the basis of the maritime
borders of Greece and Turkey. This arrangement
worked well until 1974 when Tirkey unilaterally
extended the Istanbul FIR to the West and into the
Athens ElR, following the limits of the continen-
tal shelf as claimed earlier. Later, in 1980, Turkey
lifted the restrictions that it had imposed in 1974.
A dispute still remains over the question of whe-
ther official aircraft, and also as a consequence
military aircraft, have to submit their flight plan.
Turkey claims that only civilian aircraft are obli-
ged to do so.
***
429. A solution to the abovementioned disputes
is not yet in sight. Turkey wants across-the-board
negotiations on all the issues. Greece, on the other
hand, says that the only issue that needs to be dis-
cussed is sea-bed mineral rights, which it wants
settled by international arbitration.
II. The Turkish minorily in Western Thrace
430. The situation of the Turkish minority in
Western Thrace is another area of friction
between Greece and Turkey.
431. By the July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, ter-
minating the war between Greece and Turkey,
Turkey undertook to ensure the protection of the
200 0OO-strong orthodox population of Istanbul
and Greece and the 120 000 Muslims in Western
Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne only recognises
the existence of religious minorities. The origin-
ally 200 000-srong Greek orthodox population of
Istanbul, lmroz and Tenedos at present only num-
bers some 3 000. According to official figures, of
the 100 000 to 120 000 Muslims living in Western
Thrace, 49.97o are of Turkish origin, 33.5Vo
Pomak and l6.5Vo gypsies. Neither Greece nor
Ttrrkey were to respect their undertakings. Accord-
ing to the provisions of the treaty, the Muslim
minority in Western Thrace was to enjoy rights
and freedoms in education, management of
foundations and worship. The situation today is
hardly satisfactory. For virtually 70 years, this
minority has been unable to exercise its rights and
freedoms and it has been subject to numerous
pressures.
432. The Turkish population is stagnating despite
a high birth-rate and difficulties caused by the
local adminisfation are encouraging fairly large-
scale emigration to Turkey or Germany. In the
past, several members of this minority have been
deprived of their nationality in the context of
Article 19 of the Nationality Code.
433. Moreover, the Turks of Western Thrace, the
majority of them farmers, are encountering severe
difficulties in obtaining licences to drive agri-
cultural vehicles and permits to build and to buy
or sell land. Nor are members of this minority ablb
to refer to their Turkish origins since, in accordance
with the Lausanne Treaty, only their Muslim reli-
gion is recognised.
434. As to freedom of worship, in recent years
Greece seems to have adopted an attitude hinder-
ing the practice of this freedom. In point of fact
Greece recently opposed the visit which the Head
of Religious Affairs of Turkey wished to make to
Western Thrace on24th and 25th July 1994 while
on a tour of the Balkans. The Greek authorities
suggested that such a visit would be detrimental to
public order in Greece during a period when the
two countries were experiencing difficulties, a
reason considered unacceptable by the Turkish
authorities.
435. Greece's attitude has served to confirm the
feeling of the Thracian Turks that they are being
treated as second class citizens. The Turkish
minority has therefore hardened its position and
withdrawn its confidence in the Greek parties.
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436. The parliamentary elections in 1989 had,
for the fust time, returned an independent Turkish
member, Mr. Ahmed Sadik, who was then impri-
soned for several months by the Greek authorities.
437. It should be observed that the former Greek
government under Prime Minister Constantin
Mitsotakis had started making efforts which led to
an easing of discrimination against and unfair
treatment of the Turkish minority in Western
Thrace. In addition, the Greek Ministry of Agri-
culture, in liaison with the European Community,
has launched a programme of modernisation in
the region and the government is trying to change
ingrained anitudes among local officials in order
to remove obstacles to active Muslim particip-
ation in the economy. Nevertheless, the situation
still needs further improvement.
III. Turkey and Greece in NATO
438. The very low tide in relations between
Greece and Tlrkey is now also having an impact
on NATO's activities. NAIO has been forced to
freeze all capital projects under its military budget
and to economise on current expenditure because
Greek-Turkish differences are holding up the
North Atlantic Council's approval of both
NATO's military budget ($797 million) and its
infrastructure budget ($855 million) for 1995.
439. The implementation of a 1992 decision to
activate the 7th NATO Allied Tactical Air Force
and Land Forces headquarters at Larissa in central
Greece and the establishment of a regional head-
quarters for NATO's new rapid reaction force in
Salonika are being blocked by Turkey which
:rgues that the responsibilities of the two Larissa
commands must be defined before they are
established.
4y';0. The Turkish Defence Minister, Mehmet
Golham, has been quoted as saying that Turkey
would approve the Salonika command only if
Greece renounced any aspiration to extend its ter-
ritorial waters from six miles to twelve and if the
first commander in Salonika was a Thrk, but the
formal link between the Salonika headquarters
and the problem of tenitorial waters has laterbeen
denied by Turkish officials. Both parties now
seem to be prepared to discuss a comprehensive
package deal. " In this framework, NATO's
Secretary-General, Willy Claes, visited both
countries on 17th and 18th May 1995.
Ml. Greece, on the other hand, complains that
the regional NATO headquarters at Izmir do not
exist legally and that a new decision of the Defence
Planning Committee is required to establish a
legal status for these headquarters.
Conclusians
ML The region discussed in the present report
is of exceptional importance for the security and
defence of Europe. Developments after the end of
the cold war have demonstrated that the Balkans,
Transcaucasus, the Middle East and even Cenfral
Asia are theatres of a multitude of wars, crisis
situations and potential conflicts which can threaten
the security and stability of Europe. Experience
has also shown that they cannot or will not be
ended, managed or prevented without the active
participation of Greece and Turkey, fulI member
and associate member of WEU respectively.
M3. Moreover, there is a number of long-stand-
ing disputes between Greece and Turkey which
need to be solved sooner rather than later.
444. The agreement concluded with the Repu-
blic of Cyprus to start negotiations on its acces-
sion to the European Union six months after the
conclusion of the lntergovermental conference of
1996, opens the perspective of Cyprus' member-
ship of WEU.
445. In the following paragraphs, the main
conclusions from the report will be summarised.
(a) Turkey
M6. For a long time, Western Europe's relations
with Turkey have been rather ambiguous. It did
not want it to be in the European community, but
did not want it either to be out of Europe. Tirkey
has been a member of the Council of Europe from
the beginning, but it has always been criticised for
its human rights record and deficiencies in its
democratic system. If Europe does not yet want
Turkey to become a member of the European
Union, neither does it wish to lose it, because in
an Islamic world where radicalism is in the ascen-
dant, it is the only secular state with a democratic
government which is oriented towards the West
and wishing to be an integrated part of it.
47. In March 1995, a very important decision
was taken when the European Union and Tirrkey
agreed to establish a customs union by 1st January
1996. After a transitional period, the customs
union is thought to provide Turkey with a sotd
political, social and economic anchor in Western
Europe that could help it to neutralise further
growth of the Islamic movement, which has pro-
mised to pull Tirkey out of NAIO, resist closer
links with the European Union and forge closer
ties with other Muslim states if it would come to
power. Expected economic growth and stabilis-
ation of the government's position could also pro-
vide the government with an opportunity to make
progress in human rights issues and help it to
implement the Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller's pro-
mise to bring Tirrkish law in line with Article 1071. Financial fimes, lOth April 1995
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of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which guarantees freedom of expression.
4/.8. Although Turkey is known to be a staunch
supporter of NAIO, it is also aware that the
importance of NATO has diminished since the
collapse of communism and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. Moreover, if NAIO would be enlar-
ged through the accession of the Central European
countries, it might be too busy solving its internal
problems to manage Turkey's security.
449. Turkey is not fully satisfied with its present
status in WEU, but it understands that after the
Maastricht Treaty, a link has been created
between membership of the European Union and
full membership of WEU. Knowing that Euro-
pean membership can only be a long-term objec-
tive, it has accepted associate membership of
WEU as the best possible position, and it partici-
pates actively in the WEU Council's activities.
450. Aware of the many poles of instability
around Turkey, Western Europe has clearly decid-
ed to confirm its close relationship with Turkey,
knowing that it will always have to rely on it to
keep guard over the gateway to Europe.
451. Turkey's efforts to establish good relations
with the newly-independent republics in the
Transcaucasus and Central Asia is often inter-
preted as an over-ambitious quest for influence in
a vast region which has failed to materialise. Here
it is noted that through its cultural and linguistic
kinship, Turkey can play a positive r61e in the oil-
and gas-rich and strategically important Trans-
caucasia and Central Asia, where it can help to
rein in a resurgence of Russian expansionism
while propagating the establishment of secular
and democratically governed states in an islamic
environment.
452. Apparently, Ttrkey's most difEcult security
problem is the Kurdish problem although the Tur-
kish Government asserts that it has no Kurdish
problem, but only a problem with the terrorist
PKK.
453. For your Rapporteur, the Kurdish problem
is twofold: on the one hand, there is the govern-
ment's legitimate fight against the PKK, which,
through violence and terrorism, is threatening the
security of Turkish citizens and the stability of
T[rkish society; on the other hand, there is the
legitimate quest of the Kurdish minority for rights
of cultural self-expression and some form of auto-
nomy, ideas long forgotten by the Turkish
Government which propounds the Kemalist unita-
rian thesis to the effect that the country has no
Kurdish people, only Turkish citizens.
454. As regards the fight against the PKK, it
may be best to quote the French Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Alain Jupp6, when he said'o Tur-
key is a friendly country which is entitled to fight
terrorism. But it must respect the basic rules of
democracy, particularly as far as justice is concer-
ned. " "
455. Closely connected with the PKK's activi-
ties in Turkey is the chaotic situation in Iraq,
where the central government is denied to exert its
authority over the northern and southern parts of
the country. The creation of a Kurdish enclave
north of the 36th parallel, protected by the coali-
tion forces with the support of Tirrkey, where dif-
ferent Kurdish factions are fighting each other
while blatantly violating human rights, has not
improved securiry and stability in the region.
456. Coalition states responsible for the enclave
cannot wait much longer to decide on its future.
Continuing the present status makes little sense.
The establishment of a separate Kurdish state in
northern Iraq is an even less attractive solution
because it would put into question the existing
borders in the region and provoke further separa-
tion. The only possible solution, strongly sup-
ported by Turkey, seems to be re-establishment of
the pre-Gulf war situation in the region through
full implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 688 by Iraq and its re-integra-
tion as a normally functioning state in the region.
It is to be hoped that the countries of the region
will one day return to a democratic system allow-
ing the cultural identity of the Kurdish people and
even its right to autonomy to be recognised,
without jeopardising the territorial integrity of the
states of the region.
457. As for the Kurdish minority, if Turkey
considers itself a western-oriented democratic
state based on values generally accepted in Euro-
pe, it has no choice but to find a peaceful solutiono
in particular by granting the Kurds living on its
territory democratic rights of cultural self-expres-
sion, including the undiscriminated use of the
Kurdish language. Separatist ambitions, under-
standably, cannot be met, but some form of local,
or regional, autonomy may be inevitable in the
future for maintaining the stability and territorial
integrity of the Turkish state. It is necessary there-
fore to recall Recommendation 1266 of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in
which Turkey is invited o'to seek a peaceful solu-
tion to the Kurdish problem on the basis of the
principles embodied in the Statute and the rele-
vant Conventions of the Council of Europe ".
(b) Greece
458. Greece's security concerns are clearly
focused on the Balkans and Ttrrkey. As regards
the Balkans, it appears to have given up a rather
boisterous policy in exchange for more silent and
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effective diplomacy. Relations with most other
Balkan states are mostly balanced and consider-
able progress has been made in improving rela-
tions with Albania.
459. A remaining source of trouble is Greece's
relations with the FYROM, against which it has
maintained a trade embargo in order to force it to
stop using the name " Macedonia oo and using the
star of Vergina as its national emblem. The preli-
minary opinion of the European Court of Justice,
according to which the trade embargo did not
breach the Treaty of Rome, has certainly comfor-
ted Greece's position. It noted, however, that apart
from the question whether it is in accordance with
the Treaty of Rome, the trade embargo could have
negative effects such as inciting a state to persist
in its position, or a further destabilisation of the
internal situation. The FYROM's exclusion from
the OSCE because of a continuing Greek veto is
worrying many other European states since it
excludes the FYROM from the only security
organisation in Europe to which it is eligible.
(c) Disputes between Greece and Tfurkey
460. Although the Cyprus problem has proven
to be a quagmire for more than thirty years now, it
is thought that the solution to this problem is the
key to a much-needed improvement in relations
between Greece and Turkey. The European
Union, under France's presidency, has created
new conditions which can be considered a leap
forward by simultaneously concluding agree-
ments over accession negotiations with Cyprus
and a customs union with Turkey. The implement-
ation of these agreements should be used by both
Greece and Tirkey as an oppornrnity to help find
a solution for the reunification of the northern and
southern part of the island into a federal state,
based on equality of both the Greek and Turkish
communities. Negotiations over such a solution
will only have a chance to succeed if the leading
politicians involved are prepared to forget, for a
moment, the seemingly eternal hair-splitting and,
instead, let themselves be inspired by a much-
wanted vision of common destiny. The example
of the once hereditary enemies, France and Ger-
many, having become the hardcore of Europe's
unification process could be enlightening.
461. It seems to make little sense to review the
other disputes between Greece and Turkey, brying
to propose ingenious solutions. The continuation
of almost all of them is based on deep distrust.
A solution to the Cyprus problem could be a frst
step in reversing this attitude into mutual confi-
dence.
(d) Discussian in the commifree
462. The Rapporteur notes that while the preli-
minary draft recommendation as a whole was
adopted unanimously, one Greek member of par-
liament made a reservation concerning paragraph
3 of the operative text, considering it inappropria-
te to refer to a'o veto " by Greece of the FYROM's
accession to the OSCE.
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APPENDX I73
Defence expenditures as Vo of gross domestic product
Based an current prices
1989 t990 L99L 1992 1993 *
Greece 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.4
Turkey 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.t
Based on constant prices
1989 1990 t99l 1992 1993 *
Greece 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.4
Turkey 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9
Defence expenditures per capin in US d.ollars
r970 r975 1980 r985 1989 1990 r99t t992 1993 *
Greece 107 t9l 184 235 208 208 t94 202 200
Turkey 22 43 49 47 55 62 63 64 64
Defence expenditures annual variation (Vo)
Based on constant prices
1989 1990 r99t t992 t993 *
Greece
- 
5.4 1.0
-5.2 4.4 0.1
Turkey 12.0 15.0 2.8 4.9 2.3
(* estimate)
73. Source: NAIO review, April 1994.
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